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RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE, by Ian F. 
Haney López (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003). 
 
The color line has come to seem a fiction, so little do we apprehend 
its daily mayhem.1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Book Review seeks to rectify in small measure the omission 
of color from American documents of black/white legal and political 
struggle. Enlarging the spectrum of struggle beyond the black/white 
paradigm not only works to correct the historical record of color in 
law, but also helps to advance the progress of color in society. As a 
starting point for this revision, the review turns to Ian F. Haney 
López’s new book, Racism on Trial: The Chicano Fight for Justice. 
Racism on Trial broadens and deepens the study of indigenous and 
immigrant legal and political struggle by documenting the defense of 
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the Chicano movement in its rise out of the East Los Angeles 
Mexican community of California amid the turmoil of the 1960s. 
Alert to gradations of color in race and their shading of white 
and nonwhite identity, Haney López infuses the terms Mexican, 
Chicano, and Mexican American with particularized meaning. Under 
his chosen lexicon, the term Mexicans refers to “people in the United 
States descended from the inhabitants of the southwestern region 
acquired from Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as 
permanent immigrants from Mexico and their descendents.”2 By 
contrast, the term Mexican Americans denotes “Mexican community 
members who insisted that Mexicans were white” whereas Chicanos 
describes “those who argued instead that Mexicans constitute a non-
white race.”3 According to Haney López, these sociohistorical terms 
carry distinct racial signifiers—white and nonwhite—central to the 
law and politics of identity. To illustrate the racial politics of the 1960s 
and the legal clash over racial identity typified by the Chicano 
movement in its break from the Mexican-American community, 
Haney López traces two criminal prosecutions of Chicano activists 
arising out of widely publicized incidents of mass protest and 
insurgent violence: the trials of the East L.A. Thirteen (People v. 
Castro)4 and the Biltmore Six (People v. Montez).5 
Haney López’s exacting reportage and skillful synthesis affirm 
his stature as a young scholar of wide acclaim. The author of 
numerous articles and a previous highly praised book, Haney López 
has for more than a decade marshaled the diverse fields of history, 
psychology, and sociology to mount a sustained intererdisciplinary 
study of racial identity in American law.6 The subject of unremitting 
 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. 
 4. People v. Castro (East L.A. Thirteen), No. A-232902 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1968) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). The indictment was ultimately quashed on appeal. Castro v. 
Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (Ct. App. 1970) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 5. People v. Montez (Biltmore Six), No. A-244906 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1969) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
 6. Haney López addresses racial identity in the multifaceted terms of ethnicity, 
nationality, and race. He charts identity within the currents of law, culture, and society, and 
across the categories of age, generation, and gender. See generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, 
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (examining the judiciary’s 
tortured attempts to define whiteness in the early twentieth century); Ian F. Haney López, 
Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1717 (2000) (analyzing racism as a particular failure of the judicial process); Ian F. Haney 
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controversy in law, culture, and society, racial identity intertwines 
claims of color, ethnicity, and nationality. Over time, such claims 
become entangled with pronouncements of moral character, political 
citizenship, and social status. In society, the merger of color and 
character resonates in discriminatory animus.7 In culture, the union of 
ethnicity and status echoes in assimilationist bias.8 In law, the joinder 
of nationality and citizenship reverberates in xenophobia.9 
Familiar artifacts of culture and society, commonplace identity 
pronouncements also influence the enactment and interpretation of 
 
López, The Prerequisite Cases, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra, at 127 (recounting the 
judiciary’s struggle to define whiteness under race-based naturalization laws using juridical 
theories ranging from “common sense” to “scientific” categorization); Ian F. Haney López, 
Protest, Repression, and Race: Legal Violence and the Chicano Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
205, 207 (2001) (emphasizing “the role of law, and legal violence in particular, in the evolving 
[self] racialization of Mexicans as non-White”); Ian F. Haney López, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: 
The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57 (1997) 
[hereinafter Haney López, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure] (urging the retention of race as a language 
for understanding Latino/a identity given the racialization of U.S. society); Ian F. Haney López, 
Racial Restriction in the Law of Citizenship, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: ESSAYS ON THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF “RACE” 109 (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997) 
(surveying early-twentieth-century race-based restrictions on immigration and naturalization); 
Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7 (1994) (characterizing race “as a sui 
generis social phenomenon in which contested systems of meaning serve as the connections 
between physical features, races, and personal characteristics”); Ian F. Haney López, White 
Latinos, 6 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2003) (criticizing aspirations to whiteness by Latino/a 
leadership as playing into the economic interests and power politics of white elites). 
 7. Consider for example the renewed debate over the character of Nat Turner and his 
place in the history of American slavery. See generally SCOT FRENCH, THE REBELLIOUS SLAVE: 
NAT TURNER IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2004) (describing Turner in heroic terms and outlining 
later changes in Americans’ perception of him); WILLIAM STYRON, THE CONFESSIONS OF NAT 
TURNER (1967) (offering an interpretation of Turner as a complex hero of religious visions and 
sexual demons); Felicia R. Lee, Nat Turner in History’s Multiple Mirrors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
2004, at B7 (tracing the different and opposing uses of Turner’s iconic stature through various 
historical movements). 
 8. For studies of assimilationist bias, see generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, HOW DID YOU 
GET TO BE MEXICAN? A WHITE/BROWN MAN’S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 152–74 (1999); 
CLARA E. RODRIGUEZ, CHANGING RACE: LATINOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY OF 
ETHNICITY 47–62 (2000); Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”? Assimilation and 
the Mexican American Experience, in MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE LAW: A READER 176, 
176–78 (Kevin R. Johnson ed., 2003). 
 9. On nativism and xenophobia, see generally ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN 
AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE NATION STATE 11–42 (1999); BILL ONG HING, TO BE AN 
AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION 13–31 (1997); 
IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997). 
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rights in lawmaking and law enforcement. Legislators regularly repeat 
identity tropes in policy debates and statutory texts regarding crime, 
welfare, and immigration.10 Police routinely employ identity profiles 
in targeting suspected offenders, particularly the young, black, and 
poor.11 Descriptively, neither tendency stirs general alarm. 
Prescriptively, neither escapes objection. Indeed, many protest the 
corrosion of liberal, democratic values under identity-based 
regulatory systems operating through customs, policies, and practices 
as well as local ordinances, state laws, and federal mandates. 
Remarkably, that protest seems muted when lawyers deploy racial 
identity claims in advocacy. Doubtless such claims sway the methods 
of advocacy and the outcomes of adjudication in cases where race, 
racial identity, and racialized narrative are in dispute. However 
prejudicial, they survive effectively unscathed, their adversarial 
legitimacy intact. 
Like Haney López, for more than a decade I have studied racial 
identity and racialized narrative in the legal representation of race 
cases, initially in the field of poverty law12 and subsequently in the 
arena of criminal justice.13 The focal point of this ongoing survey 
 
 10. Racial tropes of crime, welfare, and immigration typically interlock. See generally 
MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 
(2003) (describing these tropes and white Americans’ tendency to think of them as the result of 
African-American cultural or individual failure). 
 11. KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, UNDERGROUND CODES: RACE, CRIME, AND RELATED 
FIRES 55–71, 97–118 (2004). Such identity profiles racialize community policing. Id. 
 12. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994) 
(reviewing GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (noting this author’s involvement in aiding subordinated 
groups in impoverished communities)); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: 
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (arguing that the heroic 
tradition that plagues even well-meaning attorneys robs indigent clients of their dignity, agency, 
and voice). 
 13. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 
(1995) (criticizing the use of racialized narratives in criminal defense); Anthony V. Alfieri, 
Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) 
(examining the uses and justifications of racialized criminal defenses in lynching cases); 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999) (presenting a “race-conscious, 
community-oriented model of prosecutorial discretion” as an alternative to the “dominant 
colorblind prosecutorial canon of race neutrality”); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting 
Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000) (challenging prosecutors to 
“overcome the burden of silencing tradition and to explore the discretionary freedom of 
reconstructing interracial community”); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors, Race Defenders, 
89 GEO. L.J. 2227 (2001) (prodding practitioners to “reevaluate the place of racial identity, 
racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in law, lawyering, and ethics”); Anthony V. 
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concerns public and private acts of racially motivated violence, both 
black-on-white and white-on-black. Predicated on a series of case 
studies investigating the rhetoric of race, or race-talk, in the 
prosecution and defense of high-profile trials of racial violence, the 
survey scrutinizes the role of lawyers in representing clients and 
communities of color. The representation comprises criminal and civil 
rights cases spanning incidents of hate crime, rape, and police 
brutality. At the same time, the survey inspects the rules of ethics 
governing lawyer representation, searching out alternative race-
neutral and race-conscious regulatory canons for guidance. Close 
inspection reveals that the ethics rules and their professional customs, 
inured to the stigmatizing harm of racial subordination, condone 
color-coded partisanship and public nonaccountability in the service 
of purportedly colorblind, zealous advocacy. 
Tolerance of racial subordination by code or tradition reinforces 
the material and interpretive sociolegal structures of racial violence in 
American history. Of long-standing provenance, the structures 
undergird both rules and relationships. In rules, they sanction 
interpretive violence, for example in the case of racialized speech.14 In 
relationships, they sanction material violence, for example in the 
spectacle of police brutality.15 These deep structures of racist 
tolerance deplete reconstructive visions of racial dignity and 
community in American law. 
Haney López gleans his reconstructive vision from varied, 
multidisciplinary sources. His jurisprudence derives from 
Critical Race Theory16 and its rebellious progeny LatCrit 
 
Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998) (analyzing the ethics and rhetorical meaning of 
race in the prosecution of racially motivated violence); Anthony V. Alfieri, Retrying Race, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1141 (2003) (examining the ethics and social meaning of prosecuting long-
dormant criminal and civil rights cases of white-on-black racial violence arising out of the 1950s 
and 1960s). 
 14. See generally MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993) (challenging the First 
Amendment orthodoxy that protects racial epithets as free speech while excluding defamation, 
invasion of privacy, and fraud from such protections). 
 15. On race-incited police brutality, see KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: 
RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER 
MACROAGGRESSIONS 33–46 (1998). 
 16. See generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 
1997) (explaining the intersection of Critical Race Theory and feminist theory); CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stenfancic eds., 2d ed. 2000) 
(developing an intellectual history of Critical Race Theory); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE 
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Theory.17 His political aspirations carry on the labor of 
Professors Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Angela Harris.18 
His ethnographic methods borrow from Professors Laura 
Gomez, Rachel Moran, and Eric Yamamoto.19 And his social 
psychological accounts draw upon the work of Professors Linda 
Krieger and Reva Siegel.20 However numerous and enriching, 
 
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (same); 
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jr. et al. 
eds., 2002) (delineating recent developments in Critical Race Theory); RACE AND RACES: 
CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2000) (providing 
a systematic analysis of various racial groups). 
 17. On the commonalities between Critical Race Theory and LatCrit Theory, see Jerome 
M. Culp, Jr., Latinos, Blacks, Others, and the New Legal Narrative, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 
479, 479 (1997); Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop 
with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247, 1251 (1999); Francisco Valdes, 
Foreword: Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern 
Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 7 (1996). 
 18. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST 
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1989) (urging reforms that would account for class as well as racial 
disparity); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT 
AMERICA AND RACE (1995) (suggesting racism is a cultural paradigm rather than a matter of 
individual preference); Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 777 (2000) (arguing that gender and racial violence extend to state actors within the 
judicial system). 
 19. See generally ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION (2001) 
(analyzing the law surrounding the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II and the 
law regarding reparations for that internment); Laura E. Gomez, Race, Colonialism, and 
Criminal Law: Mexicans and the American Criminal Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1129 (2000) (examining racial power sharing through an examination of 
criminal justice litigation); Laura E. Gomez, Race Mattered: Racial Formation and the Politics of 
Crime in Territorial New Mexico, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1395 (2002) (analyzing racial politics 
through empirical studies); Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. 
L. REV. 321 (1987) (examining the dynamics of status-based racial conflict within the legal 
process); Rachel F. Moran, Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil Rights and 
Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1995) (describing the 
demographic shifts among Latinos); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and 
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) 
(questioning the traditional anti-discrimination law scheme for multiracial conflicts). 
 20. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations 
after Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251 (1998) (discussing the impact of social cognition 
and social identity theory on the affirmative action debate); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (same); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and 
the Constitution From a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) (arguing 
that in certain cases constitutional interpretation is best understood as reflecting social 
movements that aim to reshape popular understanding); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 
(1997) (arguing that contemporary constitutional interpretation of equal protection cases 
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when applied to the fields of criminal defense and civil rights 
advocacy, these strands of normative and methodological 
instruction inevitably confront law practice traditions 
deformed by intractable racial stereotypes. 
The practice customs of criminal defense and civil rights lawyers 
alike dictate that the colors of black and white animate the 
reconstructive visions of racial advocacy. Forged from juridical and 
political struggle, those monochromatic visions evoke stark periods of 
constitutional and democratic contest. Yet the historical memory of 
the past half-century of contest obscures the diversity and multiplicity 
of racial struggle in American law and politics. Wedded to a divided 
past, recollections in black and white omit the kindred struggle of 
people of color in Asian, Latino, and Native American communities. 
This omission stymies current efforts to formulate an ethic of good 
lawyering based on a color-conscious, contextual approach to criminal 
defense and civil rights advocacy. Unresolved in critical legal theory 
and clinical practice, a more inclusive ethical approach would strive to 
accommodate the identity interests of client dignity and group 
integrity in designing race-conscious, community-regarding duties of 
representation.21 
In the criminal justice system, trials of race-incited protest and 
violence directly confront the racial world of advocacy and 
adjudication, exposing bias in the operation of the prosecution and 
defense functions. Of multifarious form and content, those functions 
fuel my own continuing investigation of race and crime, prosecutors 
and defenders, and criminal justice ethics. Extending that larger 
investigation, this Review explores the racial meaning of the 
prosecution and defense of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore 
Six against the backdrop of the Chicano movement.22 The purpose of 
 
limiting the rights of women and minorities may be looked upon in the future with the same 
disdain that Plessy v. Ferguson receives today); see also R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect 
Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 
1081–88 (2001) (explaining that race-based suspect description in law enforcement, when used 
as a racial classification, results from the structuring of society along racial lines and therefore 
escapes equal protection review). 
 21. On race-conscious, community-regarding duties of representation and reconciliation, 
see ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 173 (1999). 
 22. For searching examinations of the sociolegal meaning of race in both the civil and 
criminal justice systems, see Symposium, LatCrit and the Criminal Justice System, 78 DENV. U. 
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this inquiry is to begin to evaluate prosecutor and defender roles in 
cases of mixed racial/ethnic violence inflicted by private citizens and 
state agents, white and nonwhite.23 Grounded in the shared premise of 
race and racism in American law and society, the inquiry also seeks to 
assess the transformative role of prosecutors and defenders in 
grassroots, identity-based reform movements. The review is divided 
into three Parts. Part I connects color, identity, and legal violence to 
the trials of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six, and the 
concomitant growth of the Chicano movement. Part II links color and 
the criminal justice system in both theoretical and practical terms. 
Part III considers the transformative politics of color-conscious 
criminal trials for prosecutors and defenders of racial violence. 
I.  COLOR, IDENTITY, AND LEGAL VIOLENCE: THE CHICANO TRIALS 
For Haney López, the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six 
trials exemplify the vigorous cultural and sociolegal struggle over the 
meaning of Mexican identity. The trials provided a forum for 
litigating both Mexican-American and Chicano identity framed by the 
logic of racialized common sense and race-inspired legal violence. 
Common sense racial violence, exerted daily by public and private 
actors, manifests itself in the discriminatory tolerance of legislative 
action and the prejudicial discretion of law enforcement. Throughout 
nine carefully crafted chapters, Haney López uncovers the ideology 
 
L. REV. 1059 (2001); Symposium, Representing Race, 95 MICH. L. REV. 723 (1997); Colloquium, 
Retrying Race, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1133 (2003). 
 23. Reconsideration challenges traditional adversarial conceptions of prosecutor and 
defender roles in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and 
Racialized Narratives: Discovering the Road Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788, 791–93 
(1996) (discounting a rule against “black deviance” narratives as unworkable because it would 
limit an attorney’s ability to provide the best possible defense); Richard Delgado, Making Pets: 
Social Workers, “Problem Groups,” and the Role of the SPCA—Getting a Little More Precise 
About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1571, 1575–59 (1999) (urging the discussion of 
“racist treatment and deployment of racialized narratives” to reach beyond the black-white 
paradigm); Christopher Slobogin, Race-Based Defenses: The Insights of Traditional Analysis, 54 
ARK. L. REV. 739, 747–75 (2002) (“The trial judge, not the defense attorney, must be the 
ultimate arbiter of which arguments [implicating negative race-based messages] are 
permissible.”). Compare Abbe Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: “Race-Conscious” Ethics in 
Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585, 1592–97 (1999) (defending race-animated adversarial 
advocacy as an essential tool that should be available for attorneys defending the 
disproportionate number of minorities accused of crimes), with Alex J. Hurder, The Pursuit of 
Justice: New Directions in Scholarship About the Practice of Law, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 185–
86 (2002) (mentioning the possible practical consequences of traditional adversarial 
conceptions). 
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of common sense embedded in a complex set of implicit ideas that 
guide daily cultural, socioeconomic, and political affairs. The ideas 
steer the litigation of Mexican identity. Moreover, they spark the 
race-based legal violence attending the Chicano movement. The first 
Section in this Part explores the litigation of Mexican identity. The 
second Section examines the common sense of color applied to 
suppress the Chicano movement and, moreover, the professed 
rationale for legal and extralegal violence declared by state agents 
and insurgent leaders. 
A. Litigating Mexican Identity 
Haney López devotes the opening chapters of Racism on Trial to 
a description of the formation of Mexican identity, describing the 
ascendance of the Chicano movement and outlining the history of 
Mexicans in East Los Angeles.24 The chapters also introduce the 
broad social currents and political themes of the East L.A. Thirteen 
and the Biltmore Six trials.25 They commence with a dramatic 
description of the educational crisis in the East Los Angeles school 
system.26 Attributing the crisis to racial politics in California and in 
American society as a whole, Haney López explains the community-
based effort to organize reform initiatives at four public high schools, 
mentioning the futility of earlier reform efforts.27 
In search of the instigators of reform, Haney López discovers a 
new generation of Mexican students characterized by increasing 
militancy over continuing inequity in education and inequality in 
economic opportunity. The student militants, emerging from 
neighborhood high schools in 1966, hurriedly founded the Young 
Citizens for Community Action, a group later transfigured into the 
 
 24. See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 15–87. 
 25. See id. at 31–40. 
 26. See id. at 16–24; see also JUAN INDA, LA COMUNIDAD EN LUCHA: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EAST LOS ANGELES HIGH SCHOOL BLOWOUTS (Stanford Center for 
Chicano Research Working Paper Series No. 29, Mar. 1990) (providing a simple history of the 
crisis and the student strikes and protests). 
 27. See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 16–18; see also JUAN GÓMEZ-QUIÑONES, 
CHICANO POLITICS: REALITY AND PROMISE, 1940–1990, at 33 (1990) (“For Mexicans, reform 
movements of the Populist-Progressive and the New Deal eras had only a modest impact . . . .”); 
Gerald Rosen, The Development of the Chicano Movement in Los Angeles from 1967 to 1969, 4 
AZTLÁN 155, 155–56 (1973) (attributing earlier reform failures to the “relative[ly] small supply 
of politically relevant resources” held by the Chicano population of Los Angeles). 
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Brown Berets.28 In March 1968, approximately 10,000 defiant students 
walked out of local high schools striking in protest.29 The protests or 
“Blowouts” attracted swift police attention and intervention, resulting 
in mass student arrests. Quickly radicalized, Mexican college students 
formed the campus group United Mexican American Students.30 For 
many in East Los Angeles, the school demonstrations and campus 
strikes marked the political awakening of the Mexican youth 
movement.31 
Alarmed by growing protests, in May, 1968 police swept through 
East Los Angeles with arrest warrants for thirteen suspected 
militants, including the prime minister and officers of the recently 
established Brown Berets.32 Prosecutors convened a grand jury and 
indicted the group on both misdemeanor (e.g., disturbing the peace, 
failing to disperse, and trespassing) and felony conspiracy charges.33 
The arrests and indictments infuriated residents of the East Los 
Angeles community, precipitating local rallies and hunger strikes.34 
To mount a defense, the East L.A. Thirteen retained Oscar 
Acosta, a former legal aid lawyer and political activist born to 
Mexican immigrant parents in Texas.35 Acosta advanced a three-
pronged defense strategy denouncing the indictments on the grounds 
of insufficient evidence, violation of the First Amendment, and 
deprivation of the defendants’ equal protection rights under the 
 
 28. HANEY LÓPEZ supra note 1, at 18–19. 
 29. Id. at 19–22. 
 30. Id. at 18–19. 
 31. Id. at 18–24; see JUAN GÓMEZ-QUIÑONES, MEXICAN STUDENTS POR LA RAZA: THE 
CHICANO STUDENT MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 1967–1977, at 42–47 (1978) 
(describing how the student movement formed the foundation of the overall movement); Ruben 
Salazar, Brown Berets Hail ‘La Raza’ and Scorn the Establishment, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1969, at 
24 (describing the Brown Berets’ involvement in the student movement and the burgeoning 
Mexican youth movement). 
 32. Ron Einstoss, 13 Indicted in Disorders at 4 L.A. Schools; Arrests Underway, L.A. 
TIMES, June 2, 1968, at 1. 
 33. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 27. 
 34. Id. at 24–27, 168–69. Five of the East L.A. Thirteen defendants engaged in hunger 
strikes. See Arrests Were Political, LA RAZA, June 7, 1968, at 12 (describing the “political 
motives” of the “Establishment” to crush the liberation movement among Chicanos); Political 
Prisoners Speak, LA RAZA, June 7, 1968, at 7 (compiling letters from political prisoners that 
indicate their involvement in hunger strikes). 
 35. OSCAR Z. ACOSTA, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BROWN BUFFALO 71 (1972). For later 
biographical history, see generally OSCAR Z. ACOSTA, THE REVOLT OF THE COCKROACH 
PEOPLE (1973). 
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Fourteenth Amendment, citing the discriminatory exclusion of 
Mexicans from the California grand jury system.36 When Acosta’s 
evidentiary attack failed to quash the indictment, he turned to the 
First Amendment, garnering strength from free speech and 
association claims.37 He also pressed an equal protection claim of 
“judicial discrimination,”38 assailing Los Angeles Superior Court 
judges for the underrepresentation of Mexicans in the Los Angeles 
County grand jury pool.39 Acosta favored this claim for its “political 
message and explosive impact.”40 By way of support, he contrasted 
the nearly doubling of the Los Angeles County Mexican population 
during the 1960s with the scarcity of Mexican grand jurors during the 
same period.41 In fact, demographic figures produced a striking 18:2 
Mexican citizen to grand juror ratio.42 Converting that ratio into legal-
political theater, Acosta repeatedly summoned superior court judges 
as witnesses to account for the underrepresentation, subjecting each 
to scornful direct examination of anti-Mexican bias.43 Haney López 
juxtaposes the trial of the East L.A. Thirteen against the rising 
turmoil in East Los Angeles spurred by community-wide political 
activism. In addition to street protests and police skirmishes, the 
turmoil engulfed the Los Angeles County Board of Education in a 
week-long occupation of its headquarters by activists from the United 
Mexican American Students, the Brown Berets, and allied 
community groups.44 The protests also provoked widening incidents of 
police brutality.45 Unsurprisingly, law enforcement agencies identified 
 
 36. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 104–05. 
 37. Oscar Acosta, ELA 13 and Biltmore 6, LA RAZA, Dec. 1969, at 2; Lawyers File Motions 
for 13, LA RAZA, Aug. 15, 1968, at 8. 
 38. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 37. 
 39. Id. at 31–33. 
 40. Id. at 32. 
 41. See Edward Villalobos, Grand Jury Discrimination and the Mexican American, 5 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 87, 89 (1972) (“Although the Spanish surnamed population of Los Angeles County 
has increased from 6.93 percent of the total population in 1950 to approximately 14 percent in 
1971, only 3.6 percent of jury nominees from 1959 through 1972 have been Spanish surnamed.”). 
See generally RODOLFO ACUÑO, A COMMUNITY UNDER SIEGE: A CHRONICLE OF CHICANOS 
EAST OF THE LOS ANGELES RIVER, 1945–1975, at 83–228 (1984) (discussing Mexican 
population growth in the 1960s). 
 42. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 32. 
 43. Id. at 30–33. 
 44. Id. at 33–34. 
 45. See, e.g., Chicano Legal Defense: The Dominguez Family Case, LA RAZA, Oct. 15, 
1968, at 2 (recounting the story of the Dominguez family and police abuses they suffered). 
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specific East Los Angeles groups for monitoring pursuant to an FBI 
policy command urging disruption of nationalist movements in 
minority communities.46 
Fearing spiraling disorder, in April 1969 the California 
Department of Education convened a conference on Mexican 
education at the Biltmore Hotel in downtown Los Angeles.47 During a 
keynote speech by Governor Ronald Reagan, Chicano activists 
disrupted the conference, holding demonstrations and igniting fires.48 
Following numerous arrests, state prosecutors again convened a 
grand jury and indicted ten protesters on felony charges of arson, 
burglary, malicious destruction, and conspiracy.49 Only six of the 
named defendants stood trial, the Biltmore Six. 
Like the East L.A. Thirteen, the Biltmore Six defendants retained 
Oscar Acosta as lead defense counsel. Once more, Acosta 
immediately challenged the racial composition of the Los Angeles 
County grand jury on equal protection grounds.50 To buttress his 
renewed claim of discrimination, Acosta again called scores of 
superior court judges to testify, 109 in all, interrogating each as a 
witness to the grand jury selection process. During the hearings, the 
trial judge twice jailed Acosta for contempt.51 At the close of the six 
weeks of pretrial hearings, the judge rejected Acosta’s allegations of 
discrimination.52 Nevertheless, none of the defendants suffered 
convictions either at the initial trial or at a second trial; indeed, both 
trials ended in dismissals or in acquittals.53 
 
 46. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
 47. Id. at 35. 
 48. Fires, Protests, Jar Reagan Talk, L.A. HERALD, Apr. 25, 1969, at A1; Tom Newton, 
Demonstration Disrupts Talk by Governor, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1969, at 1. 
 49. Nuevas Vistas 10, LA RAZA, July 1969, at 13. 
 50. See Montez v. Superior Court (Biltmore Six), 88 Cal. Rptr. 736, 737 (1970) (noting a 
motion to quash the indictment because it violated the equal protection clause). 
 51. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 38; Ron Einstoss, Acosta Quits Defense for Two Brown 
Berets: Judge Delays Retrial, Names Two New Lawyers in Biltmore Hotel Arson Case, L.A. 
TIMES, May 18, 1972, pt. 2, at 8; Ron Einstoss, Two Acquitted After Biltmore Jurors Deadlock; 
Remaining Two Granted Mistrial by Judge; Jury Cites Witness Credibility, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
1971, at 22; William Farr, 2 Freed in Hotel Fire; Lack of Evidence Cited, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 
1972, pt. 2, at 8; Lawyer Gets Five-Day Term in Biltmore Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1971, at 5. 
 52. Ron Einstoss, No Bias Found Against Latins on Grand Juries, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 
1971, at 3. 
 53. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 39. 
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The trials of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six 
illustrate the difficulty of litigating racial identity under American 
law. From the outset, establishing race-based identity and 
discrimination under federal constitutional standards required each 
collection of Chicano defendants to meet the status criterion of a 
protected class. Forged out of the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in 
Hernandez v. Texas,54 that status marker proved factually elusive and 
historically ill-suited for persons of Mexican descent officially 
designated by mid-century census counts as “white persons of Spanish 
surname.”55 Constrained by that status designation, Hernandez 
reached only the systematic exclusion of Mexicans from jury service, 
affording none of the race-specific protection announced that same 
1954 Supreme Court term in Brown v. Board of Education.56 In an 
attempt to enlarge the boundaries of constitutionally protected racial 
status, Acosta identified Mexicans as a distinct cultural group formed 
by blood and descent.57 
Attentive to the significance of Acosta’s strategic differentiation, 
Haney López carefully examines the claim of racial distinctiveness in 
light of the settlement history of Mexican enclaves in East Los 
Angeles, California, and the Southwest. He reports that from the 
early nineteenth century, originally under Spanish dominion and 
subsequently under United States annexation, Mexicans condoned 
divisions of race and class.58 Typically, he explains, wealthy Mexicans 
of predominantly European ancestry (Californios), shunned poor 
 
 54. See 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (reversing a criminal conviction because of the systematic 
exclusion of persons of Mexican descent from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and 
petit jurors). 
 55. Each census from 1940 through 1970 categorized Mexicans as white. HANEY LÓPEZ, 
supra note 1, at viii, 43–44 (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF 
POPULATION: 1960, PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DATA FOR 
WHITE PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME IN FIVE SOUTHWESTERN STATES, FINAL REPORT 
PC(2)-1B (1960)). 
 56. See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding the “separate but equal” doctrine 
unconstitutional). 
 57. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 41–50. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Comparative 
Racialization: Culture and National Origin in the Latina/o Communities, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 
633 (2001) (“By considering the variety of different Latin cultures, we are better able to 
appreciate how various Latin American groups are differentiated in law and popular culture.”); 
Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 197, 199–205 
(1998) (citing intra-Latino tensions within the community fueled, in part, by differences between 
Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants). 
 58. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 56–57. 
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Mexicans of African, mixed European, and Native American descent 
(Mexicanos). Consistent with this class hierarchy, Anglo traders 
migrating to California in the early 1840s entered mutually enriching 
alliances with Californios.59 The annexation of the Southwest and the 
discovery of gold in California accelerated Anglo migration and, 
conversely, eroded Mexican racial and social status.60 
The erosion of Mexican status implicated culture, economics, and 
geography. Galvanized by the ideology of white racial superiority, 
Anglos declared Mexicans inferior and eschewed interracial relations. 
Disparaging miscegenation,61 they espoused a Darwinian view of 
natural social selection predicting the decline of mixed origin, 
nonwhite races and the triumph of white Manifest Destiny.62 The 
postwar status of a defeated Mexico and the influx of refugees under 
the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo magnified this view, 
encouraging what Haney López describes as the racialization of 
Mexicans in terms of ancestry and skin color.63 
The rhetoric of Social Darwinism and Manifest Destiny, 
combined with the conquest of Mexico and immense land transfer to 
the United States, propelled the century-long degradation of 
Mexicans as indolent, dark-skinned criminals, notwithstanding their 
treaty-endowed standing as American citizens. Likened to dogs in 
popular culture, Mexicans suffered the degradation accorded 
members of an inferior race, treatment nearly equivalent to the 
coinciding subjugation of blacks and Native Americans.64 Predictably, 
evidence of Mexican racial inferiority alluded to skin color and 
 
 59. Id. at 57. 
 60. TOMÁS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE 
SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA 26–29 (1994); RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, THE LOS 
ANGELES BARRIO, 1850–1890: A SOCIAL HISTORY 25–45 (1979); HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, 
at 56–62; ROBERT HEIZER & ALAN ALMQUIST, THE OTHER CALIFORNIANS: PREJUDICE AND 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER SPAIN, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES TO 1920, at 92 (1971); 
CAREY MCWILLIAMS, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: AN ISLAND ON THE LAND 314–21 (1973). 
 61. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation statute), with Roldan v. Los Angeles County, 18 P.2d 706, 709 (Cal. App. 
1933) (upholding California’s antimiscegenation statute). 
 62. See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 61 (describing a “celebration of Anglo-Saxon 
superiority” that was “supposedly rooted in nature” and “revealed through physical 
differences”). 
 63. See id. at 58–62; REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS 
OF RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 229–71 (1981) (describing the historical roots of the racialization 
of Mexicans in America). 
 64. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 58–65. 
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physical appearance. Inferences from this evidence extended to 
accusations of cowardice, ill temperament, and immoral character. As 
expected, poor dark-skinned Mexicans suffered more virulent forms 
of racism than their wealthy, light-skinned neighbors.65 
Throughout the nineteenth century, Haney López remarks, 
Mexicans repeatedly bore the degradation of white prejudice in 
custom and in statute. California, for example, barred Mexicans from 
court testimony and enacted “antigreaser” vagrancy laws.66 At times, 
custom burst into vigilante violence. In 1857, for instance, Anglo 
mobs lynched eleven Mexicans in Los Angeles.67 The demographic 
and geographic custom of segregation in Los Angeles contributed to 
the growing cultural isolation and socioeconomic vulnerability of the 
Mexican community. Although census data from Los Angeles show 
dramatic Mexican population growth, sparked by turbulence in 
Mexico’s political economy and enlarged demand for labor in the 
Southwest, the Great Depression halted Mexican numerical 
dominance in the region.68 At the same time, spatial segregation in 
school districts and residential neighborhoods rendered Mexicans 
increasingly invisible.69 
Neither high rates of immigration nor rapid strides in 
assimilation checked the spreading sense of Mexican social invisibility 
and economic exploitation. Haney López notes that even as Mexican 
identity shifted from disenfranchised immigrant to rights-bearing 
citizen, Mexican status deteriorated.70 He attributes that deterioration 
to Depression-era discrimination and unemployment, conjoined with 
government-ordered mass deportations and repatriations.71 The 
development of patriotic civic associations, such as El Congreso, The 
League of United Latin American Citizens, and the Mexican 
 
 65. Id. at 62–65. 
 66. Id. at 66. 
 67. Id. at 67. 
 68. Id. at 68, 70–72. 
 69. Id. at 69; RICARDO ROMO, EAST LOS ANGELES: HISTORY OF A BARRIO 136–42 (1983); 
GEORGE SÁNCHEZ, BECOMING MEXICAN AMERICAN: ETHNICITY, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY 
IN CHICANO LOS ANGELES, 1900–1945, at 258–59 (1993). 
 70. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 70–79. 
 71. Id.; see JUAN RAMON GARCÍA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF 
MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 21 (1980) (discussing the political tension 
that developed between Mexico and the United States after the mass deportation of many 
Mexican citizens during the 1930s). 
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American Movement, failed to slow the decline of Mexican status.72 
Similarly, the swelling of Mexicans in the American ranks of World 
War II and their disproportionately high casualty rate failed to 
alleviate white prejudice.73 In fact, in 1943, white antipathy stirred 
anti-Mexican mob violence, police round-ups, and a Los Angeles City 
Council resolution banning zoot suits.74 
The scope of white vigilante violence and white-associated 
government discrimination against Mexicans varied in accordance 
with geography, class, and skin color.75 Haney López recapitulates, for 
example, that poor, dark-skinned Mexicans in the Southwest suffered 
more blatant bias than wealthy, light-skinned Mexicans in Texas.76 As 
a result, Southwestern Mexicans increasingly rejected assimilation 
and instead proclaimed their cultural allegiance to, and national pride 
in, Mexico. By contrast, other Mexicans, specifically Mexican 
Americans, embraced the identity category of “white persons of 
Spanish surname” promulgated by the U.S. census.77 Common sense 
dictated that adoption. Legal violence rendered it legitimate. 
The interplay of common sense and legal violence bridged the 
easily traversed boundaries separating law from society. 
Conceptualized in the multifaceted terms of color, ethnicity, 
 
 72. MARIO GARCÍA, MEXICAN AMERICANS: LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND IDENTITY, 
1930–1960, at 26–61 (1989); HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 70–72; see also Kevin R. Johnson, 
“Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. 
L. REV. 1259, 1297–98 (1997) (discussing the heterogeneity of Latinos and the difficulties that 
this creates for civic organizations). 
 73. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 72–73; see RAÚL MORIN, AMONG THE VALIANT: 
MEXICAN-AMERICANS IN WWII AND KOREA 112 (1966) (narrating the conflicted experience 
of a Mexican-American World War II soldier). But see CAREY MCWILLIAMS, NORTH FROM 
MEXICO: THE SPANISH-SPEAKING PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 259 (1949) (“Long before 
the war was over the cumulative effect of the casualty lists and the stories of Mexican-American 
gallantry had left a noticeable impression on the Anglo-American conscience.”). 
 74. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 75. 
 75. Id. at 79–82; Neil Foley, Becoming Hispanic: Mexican Americans and the Faustian Pact 
with Whiteness, in REFLEXIONES 1997: NEW DIRECTIONS IN MEXICAN AMERICAN STUDIES 53–
70 (Neil Foley ed., 1997); Ricardo Romo, Southern California and the Origins of Latino Civil-
Rights Activism, 3 W. LEGAL HIST. 379, 379 (1990). 
 76. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 79–82. 
 77. Id. at 43 (quoting U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF 
POPULATION: 1960, PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME: SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DATA FOR 
WHITE PERSONS OF SPANISH SURNAME IN FIVE SOUTHWESTERN STATES, FINAL REPORT 
PC(2)-1B (1960)); JOAN MOORE & ALFREDO CUÉLLAR, MEXICAN AMERICANS 7–9 (1970). 
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nationality, and race,78 common sense ideas of Mexican identity both 
aroused and legitimated violence. Legal violence shifted the locus of 
identity from the social sphere of neighborhood and school to the 
legal sphere of criminal justice advocacy and adjudication. Inscribed 
in law and legal relationships, common sense ideas of identity 
resurfaced in the judgments of prosecutors and defenders and in the 
decisions of federal and state court judges. Less of a biological marker 
than a creature of practice, race for Haney López proves to be a 
social construct shaped by difference and disparity of treatment. 
Accordingly, when seized by political organization and mobilization, 
it may be reshaped, as shown in the erupting Chicano racial ideology 
of the late 1960s. The next Section tracks the emergence of racial 
common sense and racialized legal violence in repressing the 
grassroots insurgency of the Chicano movement. 
B. Common Sense and Legal Violence: Race and the Chicano 
Movement 
Haney López dedicates the middle chapters of Racism on Trial 
to the racialized common sense and legal violence embodied in the 
judicial reasoning, prosecutorial coding, and police profiling 
animating the trials of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six.79 
California superior court judges’80 benign neglect in discounting the 
 
 78. See, e.g., RODOLFO F. ACUÑO, ANYTHING BUT MEXICAN: CHICANOS IN 
CONTEMPORARY LOS ANGELES 37–38 (1996) (noting the difficulties of developing a coherent 
history of the Chicano population in Los Angeles); CHRISTOPHER RODRÍGUEZ, LATINO 
MANIFESTO: A CRITIQUE OF THE RACE DEBATE IN THE U.S. LATINO COMMUNITY 133–72 
(1996) (describing barriers toward future race-based coalitions); Aída Hurtado & Carlos Arce, 
Mexicans, Chicanos, Mexican Americans, or Pochos . . . ¿Què somos? The Impact of Language 
and Nativity on Ethnic Labeling, 17 AZTLÁN 103, 121–24 (1986) (describing the imprecise usage 
of ethnic labels among people of Mexican descent). 
 79. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 91–154. 
 80. California statutes charge superior court judges with the duty to administer the grand 
jury selection process. See id. at 94; Lorenzo Arredondo & Donato Tapia, El Chicano Y the 
Constitution: The Legacy of Hernandez v. Texas Grand Jury, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 129, 135 (1971) 
(“Under [the] alternative method, the judges may disregard the list presented by the 
commissioner and instead may compile their own list of nominees from which to choose 19 . . . 
grand jurors by lot . . . . [which] [i]n actual practice . . . is the general rule in California.”); 
Patricia Mar, The California Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy, 1 PAC. L.J. 36, 40 (1970) 
(“Superior Court judges are given almost unlimited latitude in determining the makeup of grand 
juries in their respective counties.”); Edward A. Villalobos, Comment, Grand Jury 
Discrimination and the Mexican American, 5 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 87, 91–92 (1972) (explaining 
that California incorporates variations of both jury commissioner and trial judge selection 
procedures). 
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underrepresentation of Mexicans on grand juries and their steadfast 
denial of intentional discrimination signifies for Haney López the 
colorblind fallacy of racial reasoning.81 State prosecutors’ insistence 
on proof of purposeful state discrimination in the face of conspicuous 
de facto racial disparity in grand jury representation showed the 
color-coded masking of racial advocacy. Crime prevention strategies 
relying on racial stereotypes and excessive force demonstrate the 
vigor of color-conscious, racialized policing. 
Thwarted by the cognitive, doctrinal, and institutional constraints 
that vexed Acosta and the criminal defense teams in the East L.A. 
Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials, Haney López turns to the social 
sciences, particularly to the common sense ideology of racialized 
scripts and stock stories.82 Racialized scripts and stock stories cast 
people of color in marginal and subordinate roles, often depicting 
their character in immoral terms and relegating their voice to 
silence.83 This turn to social psychology reveals how judicially scripted 
white racial orthodoxy in law and social action channeled the grand 
jury selection process toward exclusionary juror pools and 
qualifications.84 Likewise, it discloses how police-scripted race-based 
criminal stereotypes pushed law enforcement in East Los Angeles 
toward higher Mexican arrest rates and incidents of harassment. 
However unintentional, race-contaminated common sense reasoning 
in law and sociolegal relations constituted a systemic form of racism.85 
 
 81. For discussions of racial diversity and judicial reasoning, see, for example, Harry T. 
Edwards, Race and the Judiciary, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 329 (2002); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, 
Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 405, 409 (2000). 
 82. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 109–13. On the form and content of stock stories in law 
and lawyering, see Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984). The same 
stock stories structure social life. See, e.g., PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 14 (1966) (arguing that “common sense ‘knowledge’ 
rather than ‘ideas’ must be the central focus for the sociology of knowledge”); HAROLD 
GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 77 (1967) (analyzing the “common sense 
knowledge of social structures as an object of theoretical sociological interest”). 
 83. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 92–113. 
 84. Id. at 118–27. 
 85. Id. at 134–54. On the interaction of cognitive and material forms of racism, see, for 
example, Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and 
Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2281 (2001); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 
STAN. L. REV. 317, 387–88 (1987). See also John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice 
and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 63 (2002) (discussing racial 
attitudes, perceptions, and interracial interactions); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, 
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Ironically, for the Mexicans of East Los Angeles, the conscious and 
collective engagement with state-sponsored racism opened the door 
to the reconfiguration of racial identity. 
In the closing chapters of Racism on Trial, Haney López follows 
the progression of Chicano racial identity from student activism to 
community mobilization.86 He links this progression to the 
corresponding struggles of the California farmworker movement, the 
New Mexico land grant movement, and the urban youth-based 
Crusade for Justice.87 He locates inspiration for these movements in 
the adjoining Black Power movement’s celebration of nonwhite 
identity. This identity position, proclaimed by Chicano activists and 
defense lawyers at the trials of the East L.A. Thirteen and the 
Biltmore Six, fused race, collective resistance, and state repression. 
The fusion of race and the politics of resistance transformed both 
trials into political trials. Ordinarily, the goal of a criminal trial is 
acquittal and exoneration. By comparison, the goal of a political trial 
is public education and mobilization.88 To Acosta, “trials should be 
used not so much to free the accused but to educate the masses and 
advance the movement.”89 That inflammatory, race-conscious 
ambition informed Acosta’s portrayal of the East L.A. Thirteen and 
the Biltmore Six defendants as political prisoners jailed and driven to 
hunger strikes by state persecution. 
To Haney López, the key to the Chicano movement in East Los 
Angeles hinged on the political education of Mexican youth about 
racial identity and the connections linking community protest, law 
and legal repression, and race.90 Political education about this 
 
Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures 
of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 440–41 (2001) (discussing 
prejudice and intergroup discrimination). 
 86. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 157–229. 
 87. Id. at 158–60. 
 88. Id. at 174–77. For useful discussions of the framework and history of political trials, see, 
for example, RON CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL TRIALS: GORDIAN KNOTS IN THE LAW 3 (1986); 
Nathan Hakman, Political Trials in the Legal Order: A Political Scientist’s Perspective, 21 J. PUB. 
L. 73, 125 (1972); Georgia W. Ulmschneider, Rape and Battered Women’s Self-Defense Trials as 
“Political Trials”: New Perspectives on Feminists’ Legal Reform Efforts and Traditional 
“Political Trials” Concepts, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 85, 86 (1995). 
 89. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 174; see also Francisco Martinez Found Guilty, LA 
RAZA, Oct. 15, 1968, at 12 (describing the trial of a picketer as highly relevant to the movement 
and its mission). 
 90. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 164–72. 
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“protest-repression-race”91 identity equation may come from high-
profile criminal trials or street-level police harassment. Whatever the 
source of instruction, race consciousness converts everyday incidents 
of police harassment and brutality into systematic acts of violence.92 
The Brown Berets’ resistance to police harassment, coupled with 
their military idolatry and political romanticism, aroused police-led 
state violence, culminating in the Chicano Vietnam War Moratorium 
Riot of 1971.93 Escalation of this sort caused the Brown Berets to 
degenerate into militant violence and, gradually, to alienate the 
Mexican community and its youth altogether.94 
Curiously, political alienation never prompted a disavowal of 
Chicano racial identity. To be sure, Chicano racial identity spurred 
quarrels and cleavages within the Mexican community. Haney López, 
in fact, mentions squabbles over racial authenticity as well as 
Mexican-American-Chicano tensions over cross-racial indigenous ties 
to African Americans and Native Americans.95 He attributes that 
tension to two competing visions of race: the first imagined as an 
extension of filial blood and descent, and the second conjured as a 
colored expression of character and culture.96 
Haney López notes that those competing visions ensnared 
Acosta in the doctrinal morass of discrimination law, socioeconomic 
desperation, and legal violence, finally persuading him to abandon 
 
 91. Id. at 11; see also Edward Escobar, The Dialectics of Repression: the Los Angeles Police 
Department and the Chicano Movement, 1968–1971, 79 J. AM. HIST. 1483, 1488 (1993) (“Police 
repression not only invigorated the Chicano movement but also helped politicize and empower 
the Mexican-American community.”). 
 92. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 167–82; see also CARLOS MUÑOZ JR., YOUTH, 
IDENTITY, POWER: THE CHICANO MOVEMENT 15 (1989) (acknowledging “racial, class, and 
gender inequality as significant factors in the shaping of student movements”). 
 93. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 183–95. On stereotypes of Latino/a political leadership, 
see, for example, GLORIA BONILLA-SANTIAGO, BREAKING GROUND AND BARRIERS: 
HISPANIC WOMEN DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP 2 (1992); Berta Esperanza 
Hernández-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered: Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 882, 915–18 (1997); Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Las Olvidadas—
Gendered in Justice/Gendered Injustice: Latinas, Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 353, 375–86 (1998). 
 94. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 195–204. 
 95. Id. at 218–29; see also SUSAN F. KEEFE & AMADO M. PADILLA, CHICANO ETHNICITY 
1 (1987) (presenting a “sophisticated and empirically based conceptualization of what it means 
to be Chicano”); Francisco Valdes, Race, Ethnicity, and Hispanismo in a Triangular Perspective: 
The “Essential Latina/o” and LatCrit Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305, 312–32 (2000) (examining 
the formation of racial identity and cultural privilege in the Latino/a community). 
 96. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 218–29. 
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law and flee American society.97 Moreover, he points out that the 
Chicano movement, buffeted by police surveillance and internecine 
quarrel, dissipated quickly leaving only remnants of a political 
counterculture marked by racial identity and ethnic pride.98 
Regrettably, both grand jury discrimination and racial inequality 
survived as well, tainting the courthouse and the marketplace.99 The 
same discrimination and inequality continue to plague the criminal 
justice system, itself similarly hardened to racism.100 The next Part 
employs Haney López’s analysis of race-coded police, prosecutorial, 
and judicial conduct in the trials of the East L.A. Thirteen and the 
Biltmore Six as a springboard to examine the links binding color and 
the criminal justice system. 
II.  COLOR AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
In Racism on Trial, Haney López documents the 
interconnections among color, community, and criminal justice in 
legal theory and practice. Rooted in sociolegal hierarchy, the 
interconnections tie power and privilege to racial exclusion and 
inequality. Both exclusion and inequality suppress the diverse 
alternative texts of subordinate communities of color. The texts may 
be symbolic and narrative. Suppression occurs when the everyday 
social practices of such communities are marginalized in schools, 
workplaces, and neighborhood streets. The practices extend to ways 
of knowing, seeing, and speaking. Marginality is intensified by 
political and legal clashes with the state, its courts, its prosecutors, 
and its police. 
Haney López strives to comprehend these clashes and their 
competing ideologies. An astute observer, he discovers deep-seated 
and irreconcilable conflicts in the ideological and institutional 
structures of white law and nonwhite society. The first Section in this 
Part sketches the racial architecture of law and society enclosing the 
 
 97. Id. at 230–36. 
 98. Id. at 236–39; see also IGNACIO M. GARCÍA, CHICANISMO: THE FORGING OF A 
MILITANT ETHOS AMONG MEXICAN AMERICANS 145 (1997) (“The [Chicano] Movement 
institutionalized a political counterculture that defines itself through its ethnicity and historical 
experience.”); ILAN STAVANS, BANDIDO: OSCAR “ZETA” ACOSTA AND THE CHICANO 
EXPERIENCE 124 (1995) (describing Oscar Acosta’s legacy as one of hope) . 
 99. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 239–41. 
 100. Id. at 241–50; see MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 129–36 (1999) (pointing out 
that “there is a correlation between race and rates of conviction and incarceration”). 
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criminal justice system. The second Section appraises that 
architecture from the standpoint of Critical Race Theory. The third 
Section reassesses that appraisal from the stance of LatCrit Theory. 
A. White Law and Nonwhite Society 
To Haney López, law is fundamental to the preservation of racist 
social structures. It regulates the structure of relationships and 
institutions marking both personal and interpersonal boundaries. 
Preservation of racist social structures occurs through the 
accumulation of large and small acts of aggression. The aggression 
targets individuals, groups, and communities. Ubiquitous in culture 
and society, law-ratified aggression appears everywhere—in 
classrooms, workplaces, and public spaces. For young Chicanos of the 
1960s, white law directed the regulation of their schools, the policing 
of their streets, and the segregation of their neighborhoods.101 
Prior studies of race in legal education102 and in the profession103 
graph the changing contours of racist structures and register their 
adverse impact on students, lawyers, and clients of color.104 The very 
same structures overlap gender and sexuality, compounding the 
impediments to equality.105 By organizing sociolegal relations and 
 
 101. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 245–49. 
 102. On race, legal education, and identity development, see, for example, Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1, 2 (1989); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?: The Role of 
Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 
1984 (1993). 
 103. On race, professional identity, and social responsibility, see, for example, David B. 
Wilkins, Beyond “Bleached Out” Professionalism: Defining Professional Responsibility for Real 
Professionals, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE 207 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); David B. Wilkins, 
Social Engineers or Corporate Tools: Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of the 
Black Corporate Bar, in RACE, LAW AND CULTURE 137, 138 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997). 
 104. For accounts of racial and cultural differences in the lawyering process, see, for 
example, Bill O. Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, 
Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 
1808 (1993); Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 346 (1997); Kimberly E. O’Leary, 
Using “Difference Analysis” to Teach Problem-Solving, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 65, 77 (1997); Paul 
R. Tremblay, Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 373, 374 (2002). 
 105. For treatments of racial differences across gender and sexuality, see, for example, 
Leslie G. Espinoza, Multi-Identity: Community and Culture, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 23, 28–41 
(1994); Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self While 
Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 186–220 (1994); 
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institutions, the structures implicate lawyer identity, role, and 
responsibility in prosecuting and defending racial violence.106 
Both lawyer and client identity are embodied in narrative and 
expressed in advocacy. The racial representation of colored narratives 
in advocacy shapes the prosecution and defense of racial violence. 
Basic to the lawyering process in race cases, racial representation 
exhibits colorblind, color-coded, and color-conscious norms. The 
contest between race-neutral and race-conscious norms in part 
determines the form and content of advocacy in cases of Mexican-
American and Chicano violence, whether committed by the state or 
its citizens. Advocacy tainted by racial identity, racialized narrative, 
and race-coded representation usefully serves prosecutors and 
defenders of violence but frequently proves inimical to the divergent 
interests of clients and communities of color. In the trials of the East 
L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six, for example, California 
prosecutors rebuffed the claim of Mexican racial distinctiveness, 
citing the white/nonwhite ambiguity of the Spanish-surname 
classification and the nonwhite singularity of the black census 
category, despite opposition from Chicano groups.107 In turn, Acosta 
and his defense team abandoned references to Mexicans under the 
1950 census category of white persons of Spanish surname, thereby 
forsaking Mexican-American groups committed to white identity.108 
For Acosta and other militants, the abandonment of white 
Mexican-American identity affirmed the intrinsic value and social 
reality of nonwhite Chicano identity. The East L.A. Thirteen trial 
court declined to join this affirmation. Instead, faithfully applying 
 
Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Theorizing “OutCrit” Theories: Coalitional Method and 
Comparative Jurisprudential Experience—RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1265, 1322 (1999). 
 106. On racialized lawyer roles and responsibilities, see, for example, Margaret M. Russell, 
Beyond “Sellouts” and “Race Cards”: Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 766, 772 (1997); Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me”: 
Addressing a Black Defendant’s Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed 
Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1, 6 (2002); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, 
and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1506 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Race, 
Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1069 (1995); David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 1924 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE 
IN AMERICA (1999)). 
 107. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 44–45. 
 108. Id. at 45. 
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Hernandez, the court deemed Mexicans a distinct class subject to 
discrimination; but the court nowhere found Mexicans a distinct and 
separate racial group.109 Nonetheless, Acosta repeatedly invoked race 
at trial, proffering three accounts of Mexican racial identity 
alternately based on descent, physical features, and group culture.110 
On these shifting and perhaps irreconcilable accounts, Haney López 
observes, “race was not socially constructed but physically real, 
something fixed by nature.”111 
Prosecution and defense practices in the criminal justice system 
divulge recurrent tendencies in constructing racial identity, deploying 
racialized narrative, and configuring race-coded trial strategies. 
Fashioned instinctively and reinforced by training, the strategies 
encompass police profiling, plea bargaining, jury selection, trial 
tactics, sentencing, and appeals. Informing police, prosecutorial, and 
defender actions, these “race card” tactics exploit the imagery and 
rhetoric of racial inferiority and its incendiary corollary deviance, thus 
bolstering existing cultural stereotypes. 
The subordinate imagery and rhetoric of color suffuse cases of 
racially motivated violence, both white and nonwhite.112 Litigation 
strategies of color infect both federal and state criminal proceedings. 
Prosecutors embroiled in such proceedings often infuse the racial 
identity of alleged lawbreakers with an antebellum vision of 
irreparable inferiority and inscribe in legal doctrine a stigmatizing 
narrative of immutable deviance.113 Defenders similarly invoke the 
racial inferiority of the accused or victim and reiterate a racialized 
legal narrative of irredeemable moral depravity. Neither prosecutors 
nor defenders seriously consider the collective harm spawned by 
racialized legal rhetoric, or entertain alternative race-conscious 
community-regarding rhetoric. 
 
 109. Id. at 51. 
 110. Id. at 52–55. 
 111. Id. at 54. 
 112. On the subordinate imagery and rhetoric of color in law-induced identity constructions, 
see, for example, Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in Criminal Cases: 
Cinema Verite and the Pedagogy of Vincent Chin, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 347, 354 (1996); Sheri L. 
Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1794–1803 (1993); Bela A. 
Walker, The Color of Crime: The Case Against Race-Based Suspect Descriptions, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 662, 664 (2003). 
 113. On antebellum trial narratives, see ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: 
SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM 122–52 (2000). 
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Although contaminated by centuries of applied racial animus, the 
norms of liberal citizenship afford prosecutors and defenders some 
recourse from the adversarial zeal of racialized advocacy. Liberal 
legalism offers both procedural and substantive norms. Procedurally, 
liberal norms offer a more open, process-oriented means of 
considering the racial identity of the accused and his victim in 
criminal justice proceedings from the preliminary stages of charging 
and investigation to the concluding stages of trial and sentencing. 
Substantively deduced from contractarian and communitarian 
traditions of civic engagement, liberal norms provide for the formal 
consideration of racial identity in the lawyering process. 
Consideration of this kind entails independent counseling appropriate 
to the client’s situation, candor toward the tribunal, fairness to the 
opposing party and victim, and evenhanded extrajudicial statements 
to the public. It also demands an abiding consciousness of stigma and 
solicitude for the harms unleashed upon parties and nonparties in 
racial contexts. 
Heightened consideration of party and nonparty racial identity 
enhances lawyer public accountability for the stigmatizing harm 
suffered by offenders, victims, and their communities in criminal 
trials. Fuller consideration of the harm to individual dignity and 
collective welfare in the public forum of a trial sometimes works to 
heal identity-based interracial violence and to encourage community 
participation in the criminal justice process. Under the participatory 
logic of liberalism, citizen involvement in crime prevention through 
local churches, neighborhood associations, and schools helps to 
advance the interests of individual dignity, collective equality, and 
interracial reconciliation. Facilitating those interests in advocacy 
comports with the accepted traditions of lawyer independence and 
moral activism.114 To revitalize those traditions, prosecutors and 
defenders must work to adopt race-conscious advocacy, counseling, 
and advisory roles in alliance with communities of color beset by 
crime and injustice.115 
 
 114. For strong versions of lawyer independence and moral activism, see, for example, 
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (1988); William H. 
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1988). See also 
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 77 (1998) 
(“[T]he plausibility of a duty of obedience to law depends on how we define the law.”). 
 115. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1060, 1062 (1991) (contrasting colorblind and color-conscious theories in the law and advocating 
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Race-conscious advocacy and adjudication within the criminal 
justice system links identity, community, and equality. Racism on 
Trial seizes equality as its guiding principle of reform. Haney López 
envisions the norm of equality beyond socioeconomic and political 
freedom. In his view, gathered from natural law and democratic 
covenant, individuals hold fundamental the right to freedom from 
economic privation and the right to participation in civic governance. 
Building on this view, Haney López espouses the freedom of an 
egalitarian culture and society.116 That egalitarian vision collides with 
the identity distinctions and group polarities of race and racism. 
Studies of the criminal justice system grasp race and racism to 
explain identity-based discrimination against widely disparate groups 
and to elucidate the polarization among such groups.117 The studies 
point to ingrained racial patterns in the incidence of crime and in the 
application of criminal law.118 For blacks and Chicanos, those patterns 
are displayed in racial profiling119 and immigrant regulation.120 
 
the latter); Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 
844–88 (1997) (advocating color-conscious affirmative action in the criminal law). 
 116. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 236–50. 
 117. On identity-based group animus and polarization, see, for example, Regina Austin, 
“The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1769, 1775 (1992); Sheila A. Bedi, The Constructed Identity of Asian and African Americans: A 
Story of Two Races and the Criminal Justice System, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 181, 182 
(2003); Robert Garcia, Latinos and Criminal Justice, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 6, 19 (1994); 
Mary Romero, State Violence and the Social and Legal Construction of Latino Criminality: From 
El Bandido to Gang Member, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1081, 1118 (2001). 
 118. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (1999) (“[A] realistic response to crime, and in the end [to] our 
society’s survival as a cohesive community, depend[s] on a candid assessment of the uses of 
inequality in criminal justice.”); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 387 (1998) 
(“[M]uch remains to be done to make the administration of criminal law racially just.”). 
 119. On governmental discrimination through racial profiling, see, for example, Albert W. 
Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 164 (2002); Frank 
R. Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial 
Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 851–52 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against 
Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 680 (2000); Kevin R. 
Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial 
Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 342 (2003). 
 120. Heightened immigrant regulation reveals patterns of racial profiling. See, e.g., Kevin R. 
Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New 
Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481 (2002) (describing how current immigrants are primarily 
people of color and arguing for a change in current racially discriminatory immigrant 
regulations); Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage 
Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 851 (2003) (pointing out that new post-September 11 
immigration measures will predominately affect people of color). 
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Furthermore, they are entrenched in constitutional doctrine121 and in 
the institutional decisionmaking of judges and juries.122 
Curing the afflictions of racialized advocacy and adjudication 
pervading the criminal justice system requires Haney López and 
others to grapple with elite lawyer-engineers (prosecutors, defenders, 
and judges) over the leadership, methods, and objectives of reform. 
To a valuable extent, Haney López’s guiding principle of equality in 
race relations creates a means to form alliances between identity-
conscious, community-based movements in agitating for reform in 
law, politics, and society.123 Calls for equality and equal justice, 
however, will not reconcile the competing group and community 
interests at stake in the criminal trials of racial violence. For identity-
based outsider groups dominated by elite-engineered leadership, only 
a broader ethic of community advocacy promises political progress.124 
Community advocacy may take many forms, ranging from the basic 
 
 121. Racial entrenchment is increasingly visible in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., Devon W. Carbado, [E]Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 967–68 
(2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s construction and reification of race in Fourth Amendment 
cases legitimizes and reproduces racial inequality in the context of policing.”); Alfredo Mirandé, 
Is There a “Mexican Exception” to the Fourth Amendment?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 365, 368 (2003) 
(“[T]here is considerable support for the view that with regard to suspected alienage status, 
there is a de facto, unwritten Mexican exception to the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 122. Both judges and juries suffer racial contamination. See, e.g., Jody D. Armour, 
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. 
REV. 733, 768 (1995) (distinguishing between rationality-enhancing and rationality-subverting 
racial references during trial); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: 
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 66 (1993) 
(concluding that “judicial estimates of the effects of jury discrimination on jury decisions are 
feasible”); Martha L. Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias 
and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1203 (1992) (suggesting 
that the sociolegal desire for jurors and judges to empathize with litigants reflects a 
“misunderstanding of the preconditions for impartiality and of the role of fair representation in 
producing impartial jurors and panels of judges” that results in contamination); Samuel R. 
Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black 
Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 203 (2001) (“Run-of-
the-mill trials of Black defendants in which racial issues are not obvious are more likely to elicit 
prejudicial responses from Whites.”); Michael Vitiello & J. Clark Kelso, Reform of California’s 
Grand Jury System, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 602 (2002) (contending that “California will be 
best served by well-trained grand juries that reflect [the state’s] diverse population”). 
 123. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 178–229. 
 124. On community advocacy, see, for example, Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, 
Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 950 (1992); Paul R. 
Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
1101, 1104 (1990). 
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protectionist goals of brutality prevention to the more affirmative 
goals of economic development.125 
Extending Haney López, progress itself begins in dialogue about 
crime, criminal law, and criminal justice reform among prosecutors, 
defenders, judges, and affected communities. The more diverse the 
participants and the more public the forums, the better the chances of 
systemic improvement. Public dialogue on racial reform that 
encourages community activism and mobilization on behalf of 
equality-based criminal justice initiatives can integrate prosecutors 
and defenders into collaborative roles.126 
The collaboratively fostered egalitarian initiatives invited by 
Haney López, which seem more intrinsically compelling than 
conventional ethical standards, may help check prosecutorial 
excesses. Curbing adversarial zeal in race trials enhances the public 
accountability of the prosecution and criminal defense bar, and 
restores public confidence in the bench. Both accountability and 
confidence wane when the public perceives advocacy strategies and 
adjudication methods as incompatible with mythic colorblind 
traditions. Incompatibility undermines institutional claims of 
impartiality and neutrality. In describing how to avert the normative 
collapse of the adversary system of criminal justice in race trials, the 
next Section considers the color-conscious prescriptions of Critical 
Race Theory. 
B. Critical Race Theory 
At the intersection of civil rights, jurisprudence, and interdisciplinary 
movements, Critical Race Theory furnishes accounts of racial bias in law,127  
 
 125. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: 
LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 7–40 (2001) (pointing out that “grassroots 
[community economic development] activities depend on an elaborate network of larger-scale 
efforts”). 
 126. For illustrations of community-based prosecutorial collaboration, see, for example, 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Community Prosecutors, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2002); Anthony C. 
Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 379 (2002). 
 127. See, e.g., BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE 
CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW 9 (1998) (analyzing “two central examples of race discrimination 
law with the ultimate objective of exploring the implications of transparency-conscious doctrinal 
reform, reciprocally, for law and for white race consciousness itself”); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, 
Race Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation, and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1334–36 (1988) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws, though successful 
in eliminating symbolic manifestations of racial oppression, have allowed the perpetuation of 
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economics,128 and narrative.129 The accounts augment empirical 
evidence of discrimination130 and anecdotal evidence of colorblind 
prejudice.131 Although these evidentiary accounts fail to abate racism 
 
material subordination of African Americans); Tanya K. Hernandez, Multiracial Matrix: The 
Role of Race Ideology in the Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Laws, a United States-Latin 
America Comparison, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1101–69 (2002) (examining the role of race 
ideology in the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws). 
 128. See, e.g., MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S 13 (1986) (arguing that race, as the “fundamental axis 
of social organization in the United States,” critically affects class economics); Alex M. Johnson, 
Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to 
Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1596–97 (1995) (exploring “the interaction 
between racism and poverty and the effect this interaction has on the consignment of Blacks to 
segregated, substandard housing”). 
 129. See, e.g., Margaret Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law: Ethnic 
Specimens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4, 5 (1995) 
(“Within the realm of outsider jurisprudence, narrative methodology has been deployed less 
frequently by or on behalf of Asian Americans than it has been by or on behalf of others on the 
margins.”); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2415 (1989) (examining “the use of stories in the struggle for racial 
reform”); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice 
of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 
807 (1994) (showing “the value inherent in Critical Race Theory and Narrative while providing 
insiders with the tools and insight needed to assess the value of such work”); Gerald Torres, 
Translation and Stories, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364 (2002) (“[U]nderstanding the role of 
narrative interpretations of reality is critical for designing policy changes and for engaging in 
legal analysis that illuminates more than the problems associated with doctrine and the internal 
understanding of the law.”). 
 130. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF 
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 4 (2001) (using empirical data to “contest the idea that 
race and gender discrimination in the retail sale of goods is nonexistent or unimportant”); Clark 
Freshman, Prevention Perspectives on “Different” Kinds of Discrimination: From Attacking 
Different “Isms” to Promoting Acceptance in Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics, and 
Empirical Research, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2293, 2334 (2003) (“[R]egression analysis, such as Ayres’s 
analysis of records of how hospitals assigned kidneys, how one dealer priced cars, or how judges 
and bail bondspeople set bail and sold bonds . . . has much general promise for promoting 
awareness of the disease of discrimination.”). 
 131. See, e.g., LESLIE G. CARR, “COLOR-BLIND” RACISM x (1997) (arguing that “color 
blindness is not the opposite of racism . . . [but] another form of racism”); Jerome M. Culp, Jr., 
Colorblind Remedies and Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Masquerading as 
Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 166–67 (1994) (arguing “that the colorblind principle is 
not a moral requirement, but rather a policy argument resting on several invalid assumptions”); 
Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California Civil Rights 
Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1137 (1996) (“[R]ace color blindness actively blocks 
efforts to address conscientiously the multitude of issues surrounding race.”); Tanya K. 
Hernandez, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind 
Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 103 (1998) (“[A]lthough multiracial discourse may seem 
benign and appealing on a humanitarian level, its implementation will produce counter-
egalitarian results in the struggle for racial equality.”). 
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or segregation, they give meaning to racial identity, content to 
racialized narrative, and form to race-neutral and race-conscious 
representation. 
To his credit, in Racism on Trial Haney López synthesizes 
extensive sociolegal accounts of race and racism to underscore the 
multiplicity of racial identities in law, culture, and society. He links 
that multiplicity to the conceptual malleability of race in public and 
private spheres, and to the diverse practices of racism among 
individuals, groups, and communities.132 Melded fragments of social 
life and state policy, racism inflicts particularized and generalized 
harm. Experienced at individual and collective levels, the harm 
appears natural and even necessary to the efficient and just ordering 
of society. 
At the outset, Haney López challenges the natural order of race 
and the necessity of racial harm. He discerns nothing natural in the 
ideological deployment of racial hierarchy as the fulcrum for colonial 
expansion in the Americas under early Spanish conquest or, later, 
under American military intervention sanctioned by the 1848 Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo.133 Assessing this expansion, he finds no logic in 
the creation of a racially segmented, dual colonial society. In fact, he 
views the contemporary duality separating dominant whites and 
subordinate nonwhites as a remnant of European custom and colonial 
privilege, rather than as a constituent part of the natural world.134 And 
yet this duality survives in a persistent white/nonwhite hierarchy 
rationalized by color, ethnic culture, and nationalism. 
The rationality of white/nonwhite racial hierarchy derives from 
the ideology of consent and the violence of coercion. To explicate 
consent, Haney López weaves together assorted theories of 
oppression, specific to colonized minorities, based on psychosocial 
research of white racism. He enumerates conscious and unconscious 
types of racist microaggression emblematic of European colonialism 
in contemporary manifestations of cognitive bias and nativism.135 
Microaggression enmeshes both perpetrator and victim in the 
transverse dynamics of bias, engendering domination and 
subordination instead of resistance. 
 
 132. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 205–29. 
 133. See id. at 56–62. 
 134. See id. at 56–65. 
 135. See id. at 58–76. 
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In the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials, racial 
microaggressions routinely took the form of stereotyping in 
courtroom advocacy, trial testimony, and judge-made rulings. The 
stereotypes entwined juridical and public prejudice. Haney López 
shows how public stereotyping and state-sanctioned exclusion 
occurred through the practices of administrative and street-level 
differentiation employed by judges, prosecutors, and police officers in 
racially classifying grand jurors, offenders, and witnesses.136 
Winnowing the social science literature, he reconceives race as a pan-
ethnic category of social knowledge with its own system of 
designation and proof.137 Admittedly race conscious, this cultural 
category collides against purported colorblind traditions in 
constitutional, statutory, and common law jurisprudence. 
The ratification of ethnic and pseudoscientific racial 
classifications under colorblind traditions hampered the identity 
struggle of Mexican Americans and Chicanos. Because that struggle 
spans two centuries of resistance to colonial expansion, it disperses 
widely across color, geography, political economy, and region. That 
diffusion or disaggregation of color changes racial subordination’s 
caste distinctions but not its unity of experience. Endorsing the 
political and litigation campaigns of the civil rights movement, Haney 
López seeks to find racial unity in the collective action and 
mobilization of the Chicano student protesters in East Los Angeles. 
The next Section shows how LatCrit Theory strengthens that racial 
unity. 
C. LatCrit Theory 
LatCrit Theory discerns a broad unity of identity and narrative in the 
splintered experience of Latinos.138 In the criminal justice system, that 
 
 136. See id. at 91–108, 134–54. 
 137. See id. at 109–33. 
 138. Compilations of the LatCrit literature include Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and 
Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997) 
(LatCrit I); Symposium, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latina/o Communities 
Through LatCrit Theory, 19 UCLA CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1998) (LatCrit II); 
Symposium, Comparative Latinas/os: Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 575 (1999) (LatCrit III); Symposium, Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers: LatCrit 
Theory and Marginal Intersections, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 751 (2000) (LatCrit IV); Symposium, 
Class in LatCrit: Theory and Praxis in a World of Economic Inequality, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 467 
(2001) (LatCrit V); Symposium, Latinas/os and the Americas: Centering North-South 
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experience merges with the subordination of other communities of color in 
selective state prosecution139 and prosecutorial racism.140 In fact, state-
sanctioned racism permeates jury selection and fosters nullification.141 
Likewise, racism deforms witness credibility, identification, and testimony.142  
 
Frameworks in LatCrit Theory, 55 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (2003), 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (2003) 
(LatCrit VI); Symposium, Coalitional Theory and Praxis: Social Movements and LatCrit 
Community, 81 OR. L. REV. 587 (2003); 13 LA RAZA L.J. 113 (2002) (LatCrit VII); Symposium, 
City and the Citizen: Operations of Power, Strategies of Resistance, 51 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2004) (LatCrit VIII). 
 139. On race-guided prosecutorial discretion, see, for example, Angela J. Davis, Prosecution 
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 17 (1998) (arguing 
that prosecutorial discretion—a major cause of racial inequality in the criminal justice system—
may instead be used to construct effective solutions to racial injustice); Drew S. Days III, Race 
and the Federal Criminal Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. 
REV. 181, 195 (1996) (proposing that reason, not rhetoric, should guide the federal 
government’s consideration of selective prosecution on the basis of race); Robert B. Heller, 
Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial 
Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1314–15 (1997) (advocating for 
meaningful judicial review of the federal charging decision because of the constitutional rights 
implicated); Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of 
Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (“The [United States v. Armstrong] ruling will 
prevent many defendants who were selectively prosecuted from gaining discovery, and thereby 
ensure that many meritorious claims will never be proven.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, The “Darden 
Dilemma”: Should African Americans Prosecute Crimes?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1474–75 
(2000) (“[T]he best resolution of the ‘Darden Dilemma’ is for African Americans to refrain 
from prosecuting crimes and to reject employment opportunities with prosecutors’ offices.”); 
Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution 
Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 129 (2003) 
(“questioning the desirability of the intent doctrine in the area of selective prosecution and . . . 
proposing an alternative standard”). 
 140. On the trial-specific insinuations of prosecutorial racism, see, for example, Andrea D. 
Lyon, Setting the Record Straight: A Proposal for Handling Prosecutorial Appeals to Racial, 
Ethnic or Gender Prejudice During Trial, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 319, 338 (2001); Elizabeth L. 
Earle, Note, Banishing the Thirteenth Juror: An Approach to the Identification of Prosecutorial 
Racism, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1242 (1992). 
 141. On the dynamics of race in jury selection and nullification, see generally HIROSHI 
FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY 
SELECTION (2003); Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional 
Misconduct, Not Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REV. LITIG. 209 (2003); Paul Butler, Racially Based 
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995). 
 142. Witness credibility, identification, and testimony frequently depend on race. See 
generally Maria L. Ontiveros, Rosa Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher Darden, and Me: 
Issues of Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in Evaluating Witness Credibility, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S 
L.J. 135 (1995) (commenting on the presentation of Rosa Lopez’s testimony in the O.J. Simpson 
criminal trial); Radha Natarajan, Note, Racialized Memory and Reliability: Due Process Applied 
to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821 (2003) (arguing that criminal 
defendants accused on the basis of cross-racial eyewitness identification are denied due process 
under the U.S. Constitution); cf. Leslie V. Dery, Hear My Voice: Reconfiguring the Right to 
Testify to Encompass the Defendant’s Choice of Language, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 545, 546 (2002) 
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Further, it relentlessly molds defense tactics143 and litigation strategy.144 
The historical subordination of Latinos in the criminal justice 
system underscores the Mexican experience of double conquest, 
initially by Spain and later by the United States in the annexation of 
Texas after the 1846–1848 Mexican War. Driven by the imperatives of 
white supremacy and racial dominion, both conquests trumpeted the 
rhetoric of imperial superiority. Yet the ratification of the 1848 Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo actually diminished the status of Mexican 
citizenship and diluted the right of land ownership in America.145 This 
diminution was certified by law and litigation, for example, in the 
white-only electoral franchise restriction of the California 
Constitution and in the New Mexico land grant litigation 
dispossessing Mexican property owners under the ideology of 
Manifest Destiny.146 
 
(“[D]efendant’s right to testify should be recast to include ‘in the language of the defendant’s 
choice.’”). 
 143. Defense tactics often rely on race. See generally JODY DAVID ARMOUR, 
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN 
AMERICA (1997) (arguing that common race-based claims of reasonableness must be rejected); 
Kristen L. Holmquist, Cultural Defense or False Stereotype? What Happens When Latina 
Defendants Collide with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 12 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 45, 47, 
50–56 (1997) (“As a result [of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines], defense attorneys . . . often 
find creative, and sometimes disingenuous, paths around guilt, failing to present an honest, 
straightforward look at the defendant’s culpability . . . .”); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and 
Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) 
(discussing the powerful interaction between race and the doctrine of self-defense); Kay L. 
Levine, Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural 
Defense Strategies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39 (2003) (offering a principled strategy for the 
courts to identify and handle the uses of culture as a defense in criminal proceedings); Peter 
Margulies, Identity on Trial: Subordination, Social Science Evidence, and Criminal Defense, 51 
RUTGERS L. REV. 45 (1998) (proposing criteria to govern the admissibility of social science 
evidence, including evidence used in a race-based fear criminal defense). 
 144. Litigation strategy may hinge on racial bias and prejudice. See generally Eva S. Nilsen, 
The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1 
(1994) (“Criminal defense lawyers are frequently required to utilize legal strategies that are 
morally repugnant because they perpetuate racial, gender, or cultural stereotypes.”); Abbe 
Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do 
Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 934 (2000) (discussing “the issues raised by theories 
of defense that exploit racism, sexism, homophobia, or ethnic bias”). 
 145. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 62, 158–59. 
 146. Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching the Law of Race, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1613–14 (2001) 
(reviewing RACE AND RACES: CASES AND SOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan F. Perea 
et al. eds., 2000)). 
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The juridical tolerance of racially discriminatory state 
constitutions and court decisions, which resembled the antebellum 
laws of slavery and the postbellum Jim Crow codes in the South, 
repeatedly encountered Mexican resistance. The history of the 
Cortina Wars and the New Mexico Land Grant Wars document fierce 
Mexican resistance.147 That resistance reappears now in the continuing 
battles over state bilingual education, public school segregation, and 
immigrant agricultural labor in the Southwest. Haney López extracts 
lessons from this early Mexican resistance in chronicling the trials of 
the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six. The next Part assesses 
the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials jointly as a 
transformative bridge to the color-conscious conduct of criminal 
trials. 
III.  COLOR-CONSCIOUS CRIMINAL TRIALS 
The transformative politics of color-conscious criminal trials have 
their roots outside the law and the boundaries of the adversary 
system. Here, as it is so often in American history, transformative 
politics flow from community settings and the dynamic social and 
cultural forces of grassroots resistance. The call for a prosecutor and 
defender politics of color-conscious criminal trial advocacy anchored 
in community power enlarges the principal teaching of Racism on 
Trial. By design, that teaching engages two main facets of race: 
ideology and violence. In the context of race, ideology refers to the 
conscious and unconscious attitudes, beliefs, and habits that shape 
individual and collective understanding of color, ethnicity, and 
nationality. Staked in the crucible of race relations, violence attaches 
to the segregationist aggressions of bias—including hate speech and 
poverty—as well as to the disparate force of police brutality and state 
killing. 
Racism on Trial adroitly dismantles the ideology and violence of 
race in the legal customs of the police and prosecutors, the procedural 
and substantive rules of courts and grand juries, and the 
administrative and legislative mandates of state policy in public 
education, agricultural employment, and immigration. Equally 
important, it lays the groundwork for a more race-conscious advocacy 
framework integrating the elements of racial identity, harm, and 
 
 147. Id. 
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community. The first Section in this Part evaluates the integration of 
racial identity, harm, and community in Chicano and, by extension, 
Latino advocacy. The second Section explores this integration in the 
East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials. The third Section 
considers such integrative efforts involving currently embattled 
Latino criminal defenders. 
A. Chicano Identity, Harm, and Community in Advocacy 
Construed broadly, Racism on Trial culls the jurisgenerative 
properties of racial identity, harm, and community from repressive 
traditions of ideology and violence, and then refashions them into a 
politics of law and advocacy.148 Fueled by Haney López’s racial and 
reformist commitments, his work acquires the pronounced egalitarian 
cast common to the civil rights149 and community lawyering150 
movements. Indeed, for Haney López, Racism on Trial is about 
equality in race relations. 
In pursuit of equality, Haney López strives to explore the nature 
of race in Mexican-American history and to map its past, present, and 
future Chicano trajectory. To that end, he undertakes a legal and 
cultural history of the Chicano movement through a wide-ranging 
analysis of racial inequality and violence under the criminal justice 
system.151 His central premise is that race and racism are historically 
 
 148. On jurisgenerative properties in law and advocacy, see generally ROBERT M. COVER, 
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95–172 (Martha 
Minow et al. eds., 1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and 
Opposition, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1721 (1994) (reviewing LAW’S VIOLENCE (Austin Sarat & 
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992)). 
 149. For convergences in civil rights scholarship and Critical Race Theory, see generally 
Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-Liberal Civil Rights 
Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference, 82 CAL. L. REV. 787 (1994); Bernie D. Jones, 
Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New Millennium?, 18 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2002). 
 150. Gerald Lopez contextualizes community lawyering in multiple settings. See GERALD P. 
LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 
(1992) (describing the social separation between lawyer and client and prescribing a solution for 
bridging that gap by presenting multiple fictitious case studies and analyses). 
 151. Comparable forms of analysis are found in cultural studies and LatCrit Theory. See 
generally STEVEN W. BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE 
AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2003) (discussing the confluence of stereotypes and the law); Steven 
W. Bender, Silencing Culture and Culturing Silence: A Comparative Experience of Centrifugal 
Forces in the Ethnic Studies Curriculum, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 913, 914 (2000), 33 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 329, 330 (2000) (discussing his experiences “with regard to silence and race in an 
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contingent practices linked to injustice. It is injustice, Haney López 
laments, that “creates races, especially where such injustice seems like 
common sense.”152 
From this starting point, Haney López examines long-standing 
racial beliefs and practices within the Mexican-American community 
and beyond. Disassembling those beliefs and gauging their 
repercussions, he discovers both psychological and material harm.153 
Psychological harm affects identity, which, akin to the liberal notion 
of personhood, in this instance encompasses ethnicity, nationality, 
and race. 
Racial subjugation in advocacy stigmatizes identity, spawning 
colored distortions of the interior self and the exterior other. 
Evidence of self-distortion surfaces in attempts to cross or straddle 
color lines, for example in nonwhites’ passing for whites. Evidence of 
other-distortion manifests itself in efforts to demarcate color lines, for 
example in whites’ segregating of nonwhites. The coloring of the 
“self” and the “other” generates intrafamily and intracommunity 
quarrels over white and nonwhite identity status and group 
membership. 
By contrast, material harm influences health and socioeconomic 
status. In addition to the familiar indicia of poverty and inequality, 
material harm also reflects the state violence of police harassment 
and brutality.154 Racially motivated violence in law enforcement 
stigmatizes victims of brutality by publicly profiling them as 
lawbreakers. When victims of color suffer brutality, their public 
lawbreaking profile too often alienates whites who stand at a distance 
from segregated policing. 
Sensitive to the stigmatizing injury of identity deformation, 
material deprivation, and state violence, Haney López records the 
evolution of racial attitudes toward Mexicans. Next, he measures the 
constraining impact of these attitudes upon the political standing and 
socioeconomic status of individual Latinos and of Mexicans, 
Chicanos, and Mexican Americans as distinct groups. He ties these 
 
Ethnic Studies classroom”); Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martínez, Crossover Dreams: The 
Roots of LatCrit Theory in Chicana/o Studies Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1143 (1999) (discussing how critical Latina/o theory “finds its roots in a long tradition of 
Chicana/o activism and scholarship”). 
 152. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 250. 
 153. See id. at 109–54. 
 154. Id. at 134–54, 245–49. 
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attitudes to dominant claims of a natural and just social order, an 
order bound up in the inextricable logic of common sense. The 
quotidian logic of cultural bias, bigoted commerce, and nativistic 
politics binds race to common sense. To Haney López, “race has 
become common sense: accepted but barely noticed, there though not 
important, an established fact that we lack the responsibility, let alone 
the power, to change.”155 It is the stubborn fact of race that makes 
common sense and the color line appear so tightly interwoven and 
inescapable. 
Haney López charts the emergence of the color line in American 
history while documenting its daily mayhem in the Mexican 
community.156 He follows the civil rights and racial pride movements 
of the 1960s, noting their demands for new rights and their assertion 
of new identities.157 He cites 1968 as a turning point when residents of 
East Los Angeles, to this day the largest Mexican community in the 
United States, mobilized street demonstrations petitioning for better 
schools and protesting police brutality.158 Like many political activists 
in 1968, Mexican insurgents in East Los Angeles articulated a new 
 
 155. Id. at vii. 
 156. The mayhem of racism extends to covert cultural forms of violence, see Peggy C. Davis, 
Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1559 (1989) (examining the “source and the 
strength of minority conviction that courts . . . are capable of bias”), and to overt criminal forms 
of violence, see Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 
IND. L.J. 593, 595 (1996) (arguing for “more affirmative race-based sanctions within the criminal 
justice system”). 
 157. Race and identity are intimately bound up in rights discourse. See generally Tomiko 
Brown-Nagin, Race as Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience of 
Intraracial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1915 (2003) (providing an analysis of the effects of 
race and class on two civil rights cases); Enid Trucios-Haynes, Why “Race Matters:” LatCrit 
Theory and Latina/o Racial Identity, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (2001) (discussing how Latina/o identity 
should figure in Critical Race Theory discourse). 
 158. Protests over affirmative action, bilingual education, and school segregation continue in 
California and elsewhere. See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, California’s Racial 
History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision Making in Higher Education, 
47 UCLA L. REV. 1521 (2000) (examining the history of mistreatment of citizens of color in 
California and the recent attacks on remedial measures such as affirmative action); Kevin R. 
Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and the 
Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1227–28 (2000) (arguing that 
Proposition 227, which severely limited bilingual education in California, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Steven H. Wilson, Brown Over “Other 
White”: Mexican Americans’ Legal Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School Desegregation 
Lawsuits, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 145 (2003) (discussing how Mexican Americans, for a time, 
avoided using Brown v. Board of Education to pursue their civil rights claims and how debate 
over school desegregation continues). 
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racial identity: the vision of Chicano pride and power. Paradoxically, 
in the decades prior to 1968, leaders of the Mexican community 
claimed to be white.159 But, in the aftermath of 1968, many insisted 
they were Chicanos, proud members of a brown race. 
To capture this transformation, Haney López probes Mexican 
identity and interracial relations using the historical prism of U.S. 
census archives to trace changes in perception and treatment.160 He 
reports that in 1930, the census defined Mexicans as nonwhite, i.e., 
“as a part of a ‘Mexican race.’”161 From 1940 through 1970, however, 
the census categorized Mexicans as white.162 Since 1980, the census 
classified Mexicans as Hispanic “independent of race.”163 These 
categorical shifts disclose conflicting understandings of Mexican 
identity based on cultural, ethnic, and racial group characteristics.164 
Throughout Racism on Trial, Haney López discerns 
contradictory notions of Mexican identity fixed in culture, ethnicity, 
nationality, and race. To disentangle these notions, he catalogues 
overlapping ways of conceptualizing group differences165 among 
 
 159. The flight from color to neutrality and privilege is well documented. See generally 
Ariela J. Gross, Texas Mexicans and the Politics of Whiteness, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 195 (2003) 
(discussing how some Texas Mexicans sought to be in the “other white” category to achieve and 
maintain privilege); Stephanie M. Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness and Latina/o Critical 
Theory, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 307 (1997) (discussing white privilege in the context of 
Critical Race Theory and some Latinos’ desire to obtain that privilege). 
 160. For correlations in government-sanctioned racial categories and identity, see generally 
Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, 
and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997); Angel R. Oquendo, Re-Imagining the 
Latino/a Race, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93 (1995); Luis Angel Toro, “A People Distinct 
From Others”: Race and Identity in Federal Indian Law and the Hispanic Classification in OMB 
Directive No. 15, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1219, 1223 (1995). See also Mireya Navarro, Going 
Beyond Black and White, Hispanics in Census Pick ‘Other’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at A1 
(noting the difficulties that the U.S. Census Bureau has had with categorizing Hispanics). 
 161. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at viii. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. See generally David E. Hayes-Bautista, Identifying “Hispanic” Populations: The 
Influence of Research Methodology Upon Public Policy, 70 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 353 (1980) 
(commenting on the difficulties associated with categorizing Hispanics). 
 164. On the enmeshing of ethnicity and race in identity, see generally Haney López, Race, 
Ethnicity, Erasure, supra note 6; Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating 
Latinos/as’ Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69 (1998). 
 165. Differences of color and race are embodied in law and the legal process. See generally 
MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE PIG FARMER’S DAUGHTER AND OTHER TALES OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE: EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865 TO THE PRESENT 
(1999) (providing examples of racism and sexism in trials from 1865 to the present); A. LEON 
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS IN THE 
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whites, blacks, Asians and Pacific Islanders,166 and Native 
Americans.167 Group differences, he points out, conform to a socially 
constructed duality of color: white against nonwhite. This categorical 
dichotomy assigns an unequal social status to, and imposes a 
dominant-subordinate racial order upon, whites and nonwhites, 
harming each group’s sense of self and community. With this order 
comes a set of corresponding cultural, political, and socioeconomic 
privileges. Situated in positions of privilege, white non-Mexicans 
construe Mexicans as inferior in both legal and societal terms.168 The 
next Section demonstrates how the integration of reconceived notions 
of racial identity, harm, and community in the East L.A. Thirteen and 
the Biltmore Six trials struggled to combat images and narratives of 
inferiority. 
B. Chicano Trials 
For Haney López, race is not simply an artifact of cultural 
inferiority. Rather, race and racism are embedded in diffuse social 
structures that confer identity, status, and privilege. Sanctioned by 
 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996) (providing a broad overview and history of the effect of 
race on American law); Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1705 (2000) (describing discrimination in the law between people of different shades of 
color, especially between light-skinned and dark-skinned blacks). 
 166. Racial hierarchy has long infected Asian American status. See generally ANGELO N. 
ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998) (describing racial 
discrimination toward Asian Americans and the legal system’s response); CHARLES J. 
MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994) (describing the history of discrimination against the 
Chinese in America during the nineteenth-century, especially legal discrimination); Kevin R. 
Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as “Foreigners,” and Social Change: Is 
Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347 (1997) (suggesting that changing the legal system may 
not be the best way to overcome the racial subordination of Asian Americans); Taeku Lee, 
Racial Attitudes and the Color Line(s) at the Close of the Twentieth Century, in THE STATE OF 
ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICA: TRANSFORMING RACE RELATIONS 103 (Paul M. Ong ed., 2000) 
(surveying empirically racial attitudes of and toward Asian Americans and documenting a 
hierarchy of perception). 
 167. Race-based claims marked the conquest and subordination of Native American tribes. 
See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (describing the history of legal attitudes 
toward Native Americans, much of which revolved around race); Rennard Strickland, 
Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 
U. KAN. L. REV. 713 (1986) (describing the history of race-based claims in the law used to 
subordinate Native Americans). 
 168. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at viii–ix. 
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law and tradition, these omnipresent structures erect barriers to 
access and achievement. The barriers of law, culture, and society 
partition race relations, producing a political economy of nonwhite 
inequality and impoverishment. Insurmountable in appearance, such 
barriers nonetheless may, at critical moments, fall to popular 
resistance and political lawyering. 
Racism on Trial focuses on one such critical moment of racial 
transformation within the Mexican community in East Los Angeles 
during the late 1960s, a moment when that community and the nation 
witnessed an explosion of Chicano militancy. Reasoning from that 
explosion, Haney López distills the history of the Chicano movement 
into a struggle “to negotiate the tension between white and non-white 
status.”169 For him, individual and collective acts negotiating the 
tensions of color-imbued status confront the racial world and the 
“potentially emancipatory consequences of directly engaging with 
racial ideas and practices.”170 
By evaluating both the disciplinary and emancipatory forms of 
race and racism in the criminal justice system, Racism on Trial 
provides important lessons to prosecutors and defenders of racial 
violence. The lessons derive from Haney López’s thoroughgoing 
accounts of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials. Deftly 
crafted and meticulously researched, the accounts unravel the 
cultural, psychological, and sociological intricacies of Mexican 
identity. These historically contingent and multilayered facets of 
identity help define and locate racial identity inside American society 
and outside its borders. The joinder of racial identity with the 
overlapping categories of gender, ethnicity, and sexuality highlights 
the complex, changing meaning of native and immigrant identity.171 
Moreover, Haney López’s trial accounts powerfully depict the 
violence of state-sponsored police harassment and the countervailing 
force of community resistance. Radiating out from the Mexican 
enclave of East Los Angeles, the violence initially matched standard 
common sense notions of crime and punishment. On further 
inspection, the violence rapidly lost its gloss of legitimacy and instead 
 
 169. Id. at x. 
 170. Id. 
 171. On the coalescing of ethnic, racial, and queer communities, see Barbara J. Cox, 
Coalescing Communities, Discourses and Practices: Synergies in the Anti-Subordination Project, 
2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 473 (1997). 
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acquired the appearance of a racialized practice calculated to harass 
Mexican students and monitor Chicano militants.172 Uncloaked, that 
practice warrants scrutiny not only as a misguided mode of 
community policing, but also as an effective means of inciting 
community resistance. Germane to both state-supervised community 
policing and grassroots-initiated community empowerment, the 
alternative LatCrit logic of color-conscious common sense 
recommends collaboration. Applied to street-level law enforcement 
and community empowerment, collaboration entails the cross-racial 
cooperation of police officers, prosecutors, defenders, and 
neighborhood residents in maintaining order and ensuring justice. 
Additionally, Haney López’s trial accounts carefully parse the 
internal inconsistencies of equal protection doctrine still evolving 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Earlier inscribed in Hernandez v. 
Texas,173 those identity and intent-based incongruities increasingly 
hinder efforts to uncover, prove, and remedy race discrimination. 
Whether the discrimination at issue involves colorblind de facto bias 
or color-coded de jure prejudice is of little consequence. Without 
evidence of purposeful conduct directed at a protected class, the 
discriminatory practices more than likely survive equal protection 
scrutiny. 
Even with such evidence as existed in the trials of the East L.A. 
Thirteen and the Biltmore Six, it may be impossible to establish proof 
of intent. Absent intent, the challenged conduct may freely exploit 
racial stereotypes without running afoul of the Constitution. Buffeted 
by the crude white/nonwhite dichotomy of unstable census categories, 
the status of Mexicans as a protected class disintegrates into 
colorblind stereotype or color-coded disparagement. When, as here, 
that status is historically ambiguous and culturally disputed, the 
Constitution withholds protection. Neither Acosta nor Haney López 
stands able to rectify this constitutional vulnerability, a vulnerability 
springing from the complexity of culture, blood, and descent. The 
next Section considers the equivalent integrative efforts of Chicano 
criminal defenders who, like Acosta, have struggled and ultimately 
failed to overcome the obstacles of race in advocacy and adjudication. 
 
 172. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 134–54. 
 173. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
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C. Chicano Defenders 
Although Racism on Trial teaches crucial, albeit abject, lessons 
about prosecutorial treatment of identity status and systemic 
discrimination in cases of racial violence, the transcendent lesson of 
the book pertains to defender treatment of the accused. At both the 
East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials, Acosta and his defense 
teams deployed an overtly color-conscious defense strategy defying 
immigrant-inspired stereotypes to reframe the notion of Mexican 
citizenship and identity.174 To Acosta, citizenship entailed democratic 
participation in governance, equal representation in grand jury pools, 
and the robust dialogue of political protest.175 In this version of 
citizenship, democracy, equality, and political violence are 
inseparable. Together, they grant and deny status, setting the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Indeed, they confirm the 
privilege of color, endowing the status of whiteness and the caste of 
nonwhite otherness. 
Acosta’s criminal defense representation in the East L.A. 
Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials signaled an end to the Mexican-
American flight to whiteness. Calibrated to escape the cultural 
denigration of race and the danger of state violence, the flight to 
whiteness corroded visions of the racial self. By repudiating that flight 
and renouncing its racial privilege, Acosta and the defendants 
successfully overcame the corrosive effect of common sense white 
racism, envisioning and celebrating a discrete Mexican race 
consciousness embodied in the rebellious concept of Chicano 
identity.176 Commencing from the liberal framework of equality, 
together they enlarged the axiom of equal protection to remedy the 
harm of status-based racial exclusion. Furthermore, by integrating the 
vectors of culture, blood, and descent, they recontextualized Mexican 
identity to reflect Chicano self-determination and community 
sovereignty.177 The recontextualization of racial identity in advocacy 
departed from the neutral formalism of colorblind rationality. 
For Acosta and Haney López, colorblind constitutional 
rationality is status-enforcing. However facially neutral, as Los 
 
 174. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 15–55. 
 175. Id. at 33, 230–36. 
 176. Id. at 42–55. 
 177. Id. at 51–55. 
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Angeles prosecutors and judges steadfastly insisted,178 sociolegal 
status classifications incorporate extant racial hierarchies. 
Incorporation recirculates naturalist and necessitarian discourses of 
discrimination based on unacknowledged racial privilege. Naturalist 
discourses treat racial status hierarchies as normal. On this account, 
white/dominant and nonwhite/subordinate status hierarchies are not 
only natural but also intrinsic to a social order. They are inherent 
parts of social reality. Necessitarian discourses treat such hierarchies 
as socially constructed. On this divergent account, racial hierarchies 
are contingent and instrumental; they emerge and survive out of a 
deformed sense of pragmatism. They are constructed elements of 
social reality. In the contexts of the East L.A. Thirteen and the 
Biltmore Six trials, racial privilege attached to the judicial selection of 
grand jurors and the police use of excessive force. Both privileges 
were expressed in naturalist discourses of Mexican citizen 
incompetence and lawbreaking immorality. 
Instead of yielding to white privilege and resorting to the 
portrayal of the defendants as deviant or inferior citizens in need of 
state punitive discipline or paternalism, Acosta heralded democratic 
norms of participation, equal citizenship, and political struggle by 
casting the defendants as populist dissenters and political prisoners. 
In doing so, he underscored the role of law and legal advocacy in 
pursuing a strategic union with political organizing. Haney López 
highlights this union, observing the partial efficacy of combining 
advocacy and organizing to halt the disenfranchisement of Mexican 
communities.179 His endorsement of advocacy in support of 
democratic participation points to the value of public education as a 
core element of grassroots insurgency. 
By rejecting a defense strategy built on the demeaning artifacts 
of anti-Mexican imagery and narrative,180 Acosta momentarily 
prevailed over racial stereotypes. However, because the trial strategy 
 
 178. See id. at 45–55, 103–08 (providing multiple statements by politicians, legislators, and 
judicial figures that the judicial process was racially netural). 
 179. See id. at 167–77 (describing the somewhat successful efforts at combining legal 
advocacy and political organization). 
 180. For descriptions of anti-Mexican imagery and narrative, see generally Cedric J. 
Robinson & Luz Maria Cabral, The Mulatta on Film: From Hollywood to the Mexican 
Revolution, 45 RACE & CLASS 1 (2003); Ediberto Roman, Who Exactly Is Living La Vida Loca?: 
The Legal and Political Consequences of Latino-Latina Ethnic and Racial Stereotypes in Film 
and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 37 (2000). 
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of discarding racial caricature risks tactical disadvantage, it must be 
counterbalanced by outside mobilization of community power. 
Mobilization is a function of identity and the memory of solidarity.181 
Within the criminal justice system, it may operate independently of 
offender innocence and guilt. It also may proceed despite race-
motivated police brutality and imprisonment.182 It falters only when 
aligned with racial neutrality. 
As Haney López mentions, Acosta firmly grasped that 
community mobilization required color-conscious texts in advocating 
and organizing around protest, race, and legal violence.183 In the 
Chicano movement, trial texts helped advocates and activists “to see 
themselves as brown.”184 Such texts must address the multiple sites of 
racial contest scattered across cultural, social, and political 
landscapes. Such sites are innumerable. They include courts, schools, 
and city streets. To be effective, the texts must incite diverse acts of 
resistance, such as individual disobedience, group protest, and 
community-wide insurgence.185 Resistance of this kind may spring 
from color consciousness or rights consciousness. Whatever the 
source, resistance promises insoluble lawyer-client tensions and 
intracommunity conflicts.186 Both tensions and conflicts will be 
 
 181. Moblization springs from collective empowerment. See generally Stacy Brustin, 
Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation—The Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 AM. 
U. J. GENDER & L. 39 (1993) (describing the author’s involvement in two projects bringing 
together low-income, marginalized women); Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: 
Community Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217 (1999) (providing a vast 
overview of the history and theory of community development law, and analyzing the 
relationship between empowerment and the realities of practicing such law). 
 182. Police brutality may trigger community mobilization. See generally Jessica A. Rose, 
Rebellious or Regnant: Police Brutality Lawyering in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
619 (2000) (describing the community mobilization that often occurs after incidents of police 
brutality in New York City, and arguing that lawyers involved in police brutality cases must 
become more “rebellious” in their methodology). 
 183. See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 1, at 167–77. 
 184. Id. at 177. 
 185. For early expressions of lawyer-promoted resistance, see generally Steve Bachmann, 
Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1984–85); Peter Gabel 
and Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of 
Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982–83). 
 186. On client-lawyer tensions in civil and criminal advocacy, see generally Stephen 
Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not 
to Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841 (1998). 
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aggravated by interracial distrust.187 Lacking adequate cross-racial 
modes of discourse, color-conscious lawyers, their clients, and their 
affiliated communities may be condemned to interminable struggle 
against the state and, more disturbing, against themselves. 
Read gravely, Racism on Trial condemns prosecutors and 
defenders of racial violence to an endless circle of engagement with 
race and racism in the criminal justice system. Indeed, Haney López’s 
dissection of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six trials 
demonstrates that neither rights advocacy nor community 
mobilization may be able to overcome the racialized structures of law 
enforcement, legal advocacy, and judge-managed dispute resolution. 
That futility is doubly vexing given the rapid and continuous 
demographic shift in American society in the direction of Latino 
diversity.188 
Haney López declines to explicate fully the causes of this futility, 
adopting an unexpectedly ambivalent stance toward legal education, 
the legal profession, and the adversary system of dispute resolution.189 
Considered from this problematic stance, it is unclear whether the 
overall systemic futility of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six 
trials should be properly attributed to deficiencies in civil rights and 
criminal defense advocacy and their accompanying ethics 
 
 187. Interracial distrust is common in cross-cultural lawyering contexts. See generally Susan 
Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 
33 (2001) (describing a pedagogical method for increasing cross-cultural competence in a clinical 
setting); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, 
Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 
(1993) (describing the author’s experiences with various forms of distrust, including interracial 
distrust, in his three clinical law courses over four years). 
 188. On the legal and racial ramifications of such demographic shifts, see generally John A. 
Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the Population in the Twenty-First Century, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395 (2002); Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It’s Not Just 
Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1995). 
 189. For wide-ranging discussion of race in legal education, see generally SHERENE H. 
RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN 
COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 1–36, 130–170 (1998); Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and 
Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and 
Discourse, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 847, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263 (2000); Michael A. Olivas, 
The Education of Latino Lawyers: An Essay on Crop Cultivation, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 
117 (1994); Francisco Valdes, Barely at the Margins: Race and Ethnicity in Legal Education—A 
Curricular Study With LatCritical Commentary, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 119 (2002); David B. Wilkins, 
Rollin’ on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Paradox, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY  
527 (2000). 
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paradigms,190 or to the basic fallacies of legal reasoning and lawyer 
regulation.191 Similarly, it is uncertain whether such deficiencies inhere 
in the very nature of civil rights and criminal defense advocacy192 and, 
therefore, fatally infect related forms of identity-based advocacy in 
the fields of environmental justice,193 gay rights,194 and poverty law.195 
Likewise, it is unclear whether defects of this kind may be cured 
by the inclusion of more participatory modes of community-based 
 
 190. Quarrels over aggressive defense tactics persist. Compare David Luban, Are Criminal 
Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993) (endorsing aggressive defense tactics), with 
William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993) (arguing 
against aggressive defense tactics). 
 191. Haney López devotes little attention to lawyer reasoning and regulation. For 
exceptional accounts, see generally David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 468 (1990); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 
(1992). 
 192. The tensions internal to civil rights advocacy are widely acknowledged. See generally 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (discussing tensions among participants in the 
evolution of school desegregation litigation); Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: 
The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763 (1995) (discussing the difficulty that 
lawyers have in drafting pleadings in emotional civil rights cases); William B. Rubenstein, 
Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights 
Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1625 (1997) (examining internal disputes in civil rights 
litigation and noting that such litigation “challenges conventional ways that groups make 
political decisions”); Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and 
Poverty Practice: An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101 (1996) 
(offering an empirical study of lawyer deference to and domination of civil rights clients). 
 193. Environmental justice campaigns furnish opportunities for racial collaboration. See 
generally LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001) (discussing the 
broad grassroots origins of the environmental justice movement to combat environmental 
racism); Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Age of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 459 (2002) (discussing the emergency of “local, ‘place-based’ decision-making” 
in environmental activism). 
 194. Lesbian and gay rights advocacy embraces identity. See generally PATRICIA A. CAIN, 
RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000) (discussing the legal battles that have been part of the lesbian and 
gay rights movement); Douglas NeJaime, Note, Marriage, Cruising, and Life in Between: 
Clarifying Organizational Positionalities in Pursuit of Polyvocal Gay-Based Advocacy, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511 (2003) (describing a model of gay-based advocacy focusing on 
pluralism and representation in the context of same-sex marriage). 
 195. Poverty law advocacy may seize upon identity. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, 
Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992) (discussing litigation 
strategies, including the use of identity-based strategies, on behalf of the disabled poor); Lucie 
E. White, Mobilizing on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1987–88) (discussing identity-based “impact litigation” as 
a weapon in the war on poverty). 
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advocacy196 or more political styles of movement-inspired advocacy.197 
Contemporary chronicles of lay participatory experiments in the civil 
justice arena show mixed results and noteworthy fragmentation of the 
lawyer’s role. The same fragmentation infects the criminal justice 
arena, undermining the defender’s traditional function and thereby 
 
 196. Participatory modes of community-based advocacy draw on community organizing 
traditions. See generally Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in 
Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999) (discussing how clinical instructors 
and students can prepare for lawyering within distinct native communities); Scott L. Cummings 
& Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001) 
(presenting a critical assesment of the law and organizing paradigm); Shin Imai, A Counter-
Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core Skills for Community-Based Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 
195 (2002) (relating personal experiences of community lawyering, and concluding that while 
different communities have radically different internal dynamics, common lessons may be 
taught in clinical courses which help lawyers transcend these differences); Joseph Erasto 
Jaramillo, The Community-Building Project: Racial Justice Through Class Solidarity Within 
Communities of Color, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 195 (1996) (arguing that a closer examination of 
socioeconomic divisions within communities is necessary in order to more effectively achieve 
racial justice); William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for 
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455 (1995) (considering the 
observations and reflections of three non-lawyer community organizations concerning the role 
of lawyers in community groups). 
 197. Political styles of movement-inspired advocacy seem romantic in retrospect. See 
generally ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE’S LAWYER (1983) 
(describing the personal experiences of a “people’s lawyer” in politically-charged cases); LAW 
AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS (Robert 
Lefcourt ed., 1971) (presenting a series of essays in agreement that the legal system, as well as 
the education, health, military, and political systems, are collapsing and can no longer be saved); 
RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS (Jonathan Black 
ed., 1971) (offering insight into the basic political questions confronting radical lawyers); Carol 
Oppenheimer, Rebel with a Cause: The Movement Lawyer in the Criminal Courts, 2 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 146 (1973–74) (describing and evaluating the role of the movement lawyer in the 
criminal law system). Their heroic styles have been largely displaced by the sociolegal 
calibrations of cause lawyering. See generally John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The 
Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1927 (1999) (arguing that effective representation should include 
collaboration with individual clients as well as their communities); Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering 
for Social Change: What’s a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201 (1999) (arguing that 
social change is more likely to occur through mass political movements than litigation, and that 
ethical duties to clients limit the ability of lawyers to shape the world in ways that they see fit); 
Peter Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work 
Against Domestic Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER 
& L. 493 (1996) (situating the impact litigation/client services debate as a dichotomy which 
values detachment over connection in providing legal services); Karen L. Loewy, Note, 
Lawyering for Social Change, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1869 (2000) (arguing that the objections 
to political lawyering can either be overcome using specific lawyering techniques or 
counterbalanced by the need to protect legal rights). 
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creating role ambiguity and institutional tension.198 Even when the 
individual and collective results of representation prove effective, it is 
unclear whether the curative adjustments of race-conscious and 
community-centered advocacy ought to be accompanied by the cross-
racial coalitions199 more common to electoral politics200 and social 
justice movements.201 Undoubtedly important, for now these 
questions exceed the reach of Haney López’s intended analysis and of 
my own. 
CONCLUSION 
Racism on Trial enriches academic and lay understanding of the 
interplay between race and culture in legal theory and practice. Both 
inside and outside the academy the subject of race in American law, 
culture, and society continues to inflame intellectual and political 
passions.202 Haney López embraces those passions to enlarge the 
 
 198. Role ambiguity increases as lawyer engagement in community mobilization expands. 
See generally Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the 
Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 401 (2001) (exposing the tension between the public defender as an individual actor and 
as a part of a broader institutional force pursuing consistent approaches to recurrent issues); 
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the Public 
Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419 (1996) (exploring an expanded conceptual model of the role of the 
defense attorney in which public defenders build institutions to support their community-
oriented work). 
 199. On the feasibility of cross-racial coalitions, see generally Richard Delgado, Linking 
Arms: Recent Books on Interracial Coalition as an Avenue of Social Reform, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 855 (2003) (reviewing LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: 
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002) and ERIC 
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS 
AMERICA (1999)); George A. Martínez, African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of 
Race: Toward an Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 213 (1998). 
 200. On the relevance of race to electoral politics and structures, see generally LANI 
GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, 
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral 
Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1209 (2003). 
 201. On the intertwining of identity and social justice movements, see generally Stephen W. 
Bender & Keith Aoki, Seekin’ the Cause: Social Justice Movements and LatCrit Community, 81 
OR. L. REV. 595 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements 
and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of 
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 2062 (2002). 
 202. For an exhibition of racial passions in the legal academy, see generally Eleanor Brown, 
Black Like Me?: “Gangsta” Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric Academics, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 308 (2000); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
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scholarship of race and to embolden racial reform in the Mexican 
community. Insightfully viewing the rise of the Chicano movement 
through the prism of the East L.A. Thirteen and the Biltmore Six 
trials, he reveals the interdependence of color, identity, and legal 
violence in the criminal justice system. Additionally, he deciphers the 
key transformative rudiments of color-conscious criminal trials for 
prosecutors and defenders of racial violence, and for the offenders, 
victims, and communities devastated by such violence. The Chicano 
insurgents of East Los Angeles in the 1960s, both lawyers and clients, 
understood well the gravity and peril of racially transformative 
reform. In Racism on Trial, Haney López pays elegant heed to the 
despair and unrealized hope of their struggle to give voice to a 
community coming to power in an America too long accustomed to 
silencing stereotypes. 
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